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We study collusion within groups in non-cooperative games. The primitives are the preferences 
of the players, their assignment to non-overlapping groups and the goals of the groups. Our notion 
of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive 
compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement 
need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This 
allows groups to randomize between alternatives to which they are not indifferent in certain razor's 
edge cases where slight perturbations of group beliefs change the set of incentive compatible 
plans in a discontinuous way. Collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a subset of the 
correlated equilibria of the underlying game. We examine four perturbations of the underlying 
game. In each case we show that equilibria in which groups choose the best alternative exist and 
that limits of these equilibria lead to collusion constrained equilibria. We also show that for a 
broadest class of perturbations every collusion constrained equilibrium arises as such a limit. We 
give an application to a voter participation game showing how collusion constraints may be 
socially costly. 
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1. Introduction
As the literature on collective action (for example Olson (1965)) has emphasized groups
often behave collusively while the preferences of individual group members limit the possible
collusive arrangements that a group can enter into. Neither individual rationality - ignoring
collusion - nor group rationality - ignoring individual incentives - provides a satisfactory
theory of interaction between groups. We study what happens when collusive groups face
internal incentive constraints. Our starting point is that of a standard ﬁnite simultaneous
move non-cooperative game. We suppose that players are exogenously partitioned into
groups and that these groups have well-deﬁned objectives. Given the play of the other
groups there may be several Nash equilibria within a particular group. We model collusion
within that group by supposing that the group will agree to choose the equilibrium that
best satisﬁes its objectives. This idea is not new. It has been used in the study of trading
economics, for example, by Hu, Kennan and Wallace (2009). It is closely connected to the
idea in mechanism design that within a mechanism a particular group must not wish to
recontract in an incentive compatible way. In this setting the group could be a group of
bidders in an auction as in McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Caillaud and Jéhiel (1998),
or it might consist of a supervisor and agent in the Principal/Supervisor/Agent model of
Tirole (1986).4 In political economy Levine and Modica (2016)'s model of peer pressure
and its application to the role of political parties in elections by Levine and Mattozzi (2016)
use the same notion of collusion.
The key problem that we address is that strict collusion constrained equilibria in which
groups simultaneously try to satisfy their goals subject to incentive constraints do not gen-
erally exist. We show that this is due to the discontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence
and show how it can be overcome by allowing, under certain razor's edge conditions, ran-
domizations by groups between alternatives to which they are not indiﬀerent. This leads
to what we call collusion constrained equilibrium. These are a special type of correlated
equilibrium of the underlying non-cooperative game. To explain why this is the right def-
inition we ﬁrst consider three perturbations of the underlying model. We consider models
in which there is slight randomness in group beliefs. We consider models in which groups
may overcome incentive constraints at a substantial enforcement cost. For both of these
perturbations strict collusion constrained equilibria exist and as the perturbation vanishes
the equilibria of the perturbed game converge to collusion constrained equilibria of the un-
4See also the more general literature on hierarchical models discussed in Tirole (1992) or Celik (2009). For
other types of mechanisms see Laﬀont and Martimort (1997). Most of these papers study a single collusive
group. One exception is Che and Kim (2009) who allow multiple groups they refer to as cartels. In the
theory of clubs, such as Cole and Prescott (1997) and Ellickson et al (2001), implicitly collusion takes place
within (many) clubs - but the clubs interact in a market rather than a game environment.
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derlying game. Finally, we consider a model in which there is a non-cooperative meta-game
played between leaders and evaluators of groups and in which leaders have a slight va-
lence. In this game Bayesian perfect equilibria exist and as the valence approaches zero
the equilibrium play path converges to a collusion constrained equilibria of the underlying
game.
These upper hemicontinuity results with respect to three perturbations show that the
set of collusion constrained equilibria is big enough in the sense of containing the limits
of equilibria of perturbed models. It leaves open the question of whether the set is too
big in the sense that perhaps not all collusion constrained equilibria arise as such limits.
Indeed, we show in a simple example that limits from perturbed games lead to strict reﬁne-
ments of collusion constrained equilibria - albeit diﬀerent reﬁnements depending on which
perturbation we consider. The example also raises the possibility that the set of collusion
constrained equilibria is too big because some collusion constrained equilibria do not arise
as any limit from perturbed games. The example, however, is degenerate. In our ﬁnal theo-
retical result we consider a combination of belief and enforcement cost perturbation, and to
eliminate degeneracy allow also perturbations to the group objective. Once again in these
perturbed games strict collusion constrained equilibria exist and converge to collusion con-
strained equilibria of the underlying game. However, for this broader class of perturbations
we have the converse as well: all collusion constrained equilibria of the underlying game
arise as such limits. Hence the set of collusion constrained equilibria is exactly the right
size, being characterized as the set of limit points of strict collusion constrained equilibria
for this broader class of perturbations.
In our theory incentive constraints play a key role. In applied work the presence of
incentive constraints within groups has often been ignored. For example political economists
and economic historians often treat competing groups as single individuals: it is as if the
group has an unaccountable leader who makes binding decisions for the group. In Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000)'s theory of the extension of the franchise there are two groups, the
elites and the masses, who act without incentive constraints. Similarly in the current
literature on the role of taxation by the monarchy leading to more democratic institutions
the game typically involves a monarch and a group (the elite).5 A similar class of models are
leadership models in which a group beneﬁts from its members coordinating their actions in
the presence of imperfect information about the environment.6 In this literature, however,
there is no game between groups - the problem is how to exploit the information being
5Hoﬀman and Rosenthal (2000) explicitly assume that the monarch and the elite act as single agents,
and this assumption seems to be accepted by later writers such as Dincecco, Federico and Vindigni (2011).
6For example Hermalin (1998), Dewan and Myatt (2008) and Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2013).
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acquired by leader and group members in the group interest.7 In our leader/evaluator
perturbation we also assume that the group decision is made by a single leader, but we add
to the game evaluators who punish the leader for violating incentive constraints. We focus
on strategic interaction between groups and a central element of our model is accountability,
in that a leader whose recommendations are not endorsed by the group will be punished.
The branch of the game theory literature that is most closely connected to the ideas
we develop here is the literature that uses non-cooperative methods to analyze cooperative
games. There, however, the emphasis has been on the endogenous formation of coalitions.
One example is Ray and Vohra (1999) who introduce a game in which players bargain over
the formation of coalitions by making proposals to coalitions and accepting or rejecting
those proposals within coalitions. This literature generally describes the game by means
of a characteristic function and involves proposals and bargaining. We work in a frame-
work of implicit or explicit coordination among group members in a non-cooperative game
among groups. This is similar in spirit to Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987)'s variation
on strong Nash equilibrium, that they call coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, although the
details of our model are rather diﬀerent.
To make the theory more concrete we study an example based on the voter participation
model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and Levine and Mattozzi (2016). We consider two
parties voting over a transfer payment and we depart slightly from the standard model
by assuming that ties are costly. In this setting we ﬁnd all the Nash equilibria, all the
collusion constrained equilibria, and all the equilibria in which the groups have a costless
enforcement technology. We study how the equilibria compare as the stakes are increased.
For small stakes nobody votes. For larger stakes in Nash equilibrium it is always possible
for the small party to win. If the stakes are large enough in collusion constrained and
costless enforcement equilibrium the large party preempts the small and wins the election.
For intermediate stakes strict collusion constrained equilibria do not exist, but collusion
constrained equilibria do. For most parameter conﬁgurations the collusion constrained
equilibria are more favorable for the large party than Nash equilibrium, less favorable than
costless enforcement equilibrium, and less eﬃcient than either.
2. A Motivating Example
The simplest - and as indicated in the introduction a widely used - theory of collusion
is one in which players are exogenously divided into groups subject to incentive constraints.
The basic idea we explore in this paper is that if - given the play of other groups - there
7For example, Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2013) ﬁnd for example that the leader should not
put too much weight on the information coming from followers (what they call resoluteness of the leader).
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is more than one in-group equilibrium then a collusive group should be able to agree or
coordinate on their most desired equilibrium.
Example 1. We start with an example with three players. The ﬁrst two players form a
collusive group while the third acts independently. The obvious condition to impose in this
setting is that given the play of player 3, players 1 and 2 should agree on the incentive
compatible (mixed) common action that gives them the most utility. However, in the
following game there is no equilibrium that satisﬁes this prescription.
Speciﬁcally, each player chooses one of two actions, C or D and the payoﬀs can be
written in bi-matrix form. If player 3 plays C the payoﬀ matrix for the actions of players 1
and 2 is a symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma game in which player 3 prefers that 1 and 2 both
cooperate (play C)
C D
C 6, 6, 5 0, 8, 0
D 8, 0, 0 2, 2, 0
Think here of player 3 as an altruist who would like to see players 1 and 2 cooperate. This is
worth 5 to him, but of course they will not cooperate given these payoﬀs. In order to induce
cooperation player 3 has the option of paying 4 each to players 1 and 2 if they cooperate.
Call this strategy by D for player 3 and suppose the payoﬀ are
C D
C 10, 10, 0 0, 8, 5
D 8, 0, 5 2, 2, 5
The interpretation of player 3's payoﬀ is this. By subsiding players 1 and 2 conditional
on cooperation, player 3 feels she has done her best and this gives her utility of 5. If they
do not cooperate this is what she gets. If players 1 and 2 do cooperate then player 3 gets
5 from having done her best, plus the beneﬁt of 5 from seeing them both cooperate, minus
the utility cost of the subsidy of 8, which we assume to be 10; she thus receives a net utility
of 0. In this game player 3 prefers that players 1 and 2 fail to cooperate so he can have the
pleasure of knowing she did her best without the cost of actually doing it.
Let αi denote the probability with which player i plays C. We examine the set of
equilibria for players 1 and 2 given the strategy α3 of player 3. The payoﬀ matrix for those
two players is
C D
C 6 + 4(1− α3), 6 + 4(1− α3) 0, 8
D 8, 0 2, 2
so that as α3 starts at 1 the two players face a prisoner's dilemma game with a unique
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Nash equilibrium at D,D, and as α3 decreases the payoﬀ to cooperation is increasing until
at α3 = 1/2 the game becomes a coordination game and the set of equilibria changes
discontinuously with a second pure strategy equilibrium at C,C; for α3 < 1/2 there is an
additional symmetric strictly mixed equilibrium in which α1 = α2 = 1/2(1− α3).
How should the group of player 1 and player 2 collude given the play of player 3? If
α3 > 1/2 they have no choice: there is only one in-group equilibrium at D,D. For α3 ≤ 1/2
they each get 6 + 4(1−α3) at the C,C equilibrium, 2 at the D,D equilibrium, and strictly
less than 6 + 4(1−α3) at the strictly mixed equilibrium. So if α3 ≤ 1/2 they should choose
C,C. Notice that in this example there is no ambiguity about the preferences of the group:
they unanimously agree which is the best equilibrium.
We may summarize the play of the group by the group best response. If α3 > 1/2 then
the group plays D,D while if α3 ≤ 1/2 the group plays C,C. What is the best response
of player 3 to the play of the group? When the group plays D,D player 3 should play D
and so α3 = 0 which is not larger than 1/2; when the group plays C,C player 3 should play
C and so α3 = 1 which is not less than or equal to 1/2. Hence there is no equilibrium of
the game in which the group of player 1 and player 2 chooses the best in-group equilibrium
given the play of player 3.
In this example, the non-existence of an equilibrium in which player 1 and player 2
collude is driven by the discontinuity in the group best response: a small change in the
probability of α3 leads to an abrupt change in the behavior of the group, for as α3 is increased
slightly above .5 the C,C equilibrium for the group abruptly vanishes. The key idea of this
paper is that this discontinuity is a shortcoming of the model rather than an intrinsic feature
of the underlying group behavior. To motivate our proposed alternative let us step back
for a moment to consider mixed strategy equilibria in ordinary ﬁnite games. There also
the best response changes abruptly as beliefs pass through the critical point of indiﬀerence,
albeit with the key diﬀerence that at the critical point randomization is allowed. But the
abrupt change in the best response function still does not make sense from an economic
point of view. A standard perspective on this is that of Harsanyi (1973) puriﬁcation, or
more concretely the limit of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)'s Quantal Response Equilibria:
the underlying model is perturbed in such a way that as indiﬀerence is approached players
begin to randomize and the probability with which each action is taken is a smooth function
of beliefs; in the limit as the perturbation becomes small, like the Cheshire cat, only the
randomization remains. Similarly, in the context of group behavior, it makes sense that
as the beliefs of a group change the probability with which they play diﬀerent equilibria
varies continuously. Consider, for example, α3 = 0.499 versus α3 = 0.501. In a practical
setting where nobody actually knows α3 does it make sense to assert that in the former
case player 1 and 2 with probability 1 agree that α3 ≤ 0.5 and in the latter case that
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α3 > 0.5? We think it makes more sense that they might in the ﬁrst case agree that
α3 ≤ 0.5 with 90% probability and mistakenly agree that α3 > 0.5 with 10% probability
and conversely in the second case. Consequently when α3 = 0.499 there would never-the-
less be a 10% chance that the group would choose to play D,D not realizing that C,C is
incentive compatible, while when α3 = 0.501 there would be a 10% chance that they would
choose to play C,C incorrectly thinking that it is incentive compatible. We will develop
below a formal model in which groups have beliefs that are a random function of the true
play of the other groups and are only approximately correct. For the moment we expect,
as in Harsanyi (1973), that in that limit only the randomization will remain. Our ﬁrst step
is to introduce a model that captures the grin of the Cheshire cat: we will simply assume
that randomization is possible at the critical point. In the example we assert that when
α3 = 0.5 and the incentive constraint exactly binds, the equilibrium assigns a probability
to C,C being the equilibrium that is played by the group.8 That is, when the incentive
constraint holds exactly we do not assume that the group can choose their most preferred
equilibrium, but instead we assume that there is an endogenously determined probability
that they will be able to choose that equilibrium.
Remark. Discontinuity and non-existence is not an artifact of restricting attention to Nash
equilibrium. The same issue arises if we assume that players 1 and 2 can use correlated
strategies. When the game is a prisoner's dilemma, that is, α3 > 1/2 then strict dominance
implies that the unique Nash equilibrium is also the unique correlated equilibrium. When
α3 ≤ 1/2 the correlated equilibrium set is indeed larger than the Nash equilibrium set
(containing at the very least the public randomizations over the Nash equilibria), but these
correlated equilibria are all inferior for players 1 and 2 to C,C so will they never be chosen.
While it is true that the correlated equilibrium correspondence is better behaved than
the Nash equilibrium correspondence - it is convex valued and upper hemicontinuous - this
example shows that the selection from that correspondence that chooses the best equilibrium
for the group is never-the-less badly behaved - it is discontinuous.
This bad behavior of the best-equilibrium correspondence is related to some of the
earliest work on competitive equilibrium. Arrow and Debreu (1954) showed that the best
choice from a constraint set is well-behaved when the constraint set is lower hemicontinuous.
If it is then maximum theorem can be applied to show that the argmax is a continuous
correspondence. However, neither the Nash nor correlated equilibrium correspondence used
as a constraint set is lower hemicontinuous, and - as we have seen - the best-equilibrium
correspondence can then fail to be continuous.
8This is similar to Simon and Zame (1990)'s endogenous choice of sharing rules.
6
3. Collusion Constrained Equilibrium
3.1. The Environment
We now introduce our formal model of collusive groups that pursue their own interest
subject to within-group individual incentive constraints. The membership in these groups
is exogenously given and the ability of a group to collude is independent of actions taken by
players outside of the group. We emphasize that we use the word collusion in the limited
meaning that the group can choose an equilibrium to its liking. The goals of the group -
like those of individuals - are exogenously speciﬁed: we do not consider the possibility of
conﬂict within the group over goals.
Our basic setting is that of a standard normal form game. There are players i =
1, 2, . . . I; player i chooses actions from a ﬁnite set ai ∈ Ai and receives utility ui(ai, a−i).
On top of this standard normal form game we have the structure of groups k = 1,2, . . .K.
There is a ﬁxed assignment of players to groups i 7→ k(i). Notice that each player is assigned
to exactly one group and that the assignment is ﬁxed and exogenous. We use ak ∈ Ak to
denote (pure) proﬁles of actions within group k and a to denote the proﬁle of actions over




iui(ak, a−k) for some positive utility weights βi > 0. This implies
on the one hand a preference for Pareto eﬃcient plans, but also agreement on the welfare
weights.
We assume that groups can make plans independently from other groups. We take this
to mean that each group k has an independent group randomizing device the realization of
which is known to all group members but not to players who are not group members. One
implication of this is that the play of group k appears from the perspective of other groups
to be a correlated strategy - a probability distribution ρk ∈ Rk over pure action proﬁles Ak.
In addition to the group randomizing device the individual players in group can randomize,
so that by using the group randomizing device the group can randomly choose a proﬁle of
mixed strategies for group members. We let αk ∈ Ak represent such a proﬁle, albeit we
take Ak ⊆ Rk so that rather than regarding αk as a proﬁle of mixed strategies we choose
to regard it as the generated distribution over pure strategy proﬁles Ak. Hence if the group
mixes over a subset Bk ⊆ Ak using the group randomizing device the result is in the convex
hull of Bk which we write as H(Bk).
Players choose deviations di ∈ Di = Ai ∪ {0} where the deviation di = 0 means mix
according to the group plan. Individual utility functions then give rise to a function
U i(di, αk, a−k) =
{ ∑
ak u
i(ai, ak−i, a−k)αk[ak] di = 0∑
ak u
i(di, ak−i, a−k)αk[ak] di 6= 0 .
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It is convenient also to have a function that summarizes the degree of incentive incompat-
ibility of a group plan. Noting that the randomizations of groups are independent of one
another, for αk ∈ Ak, ρ−k ∈ R−k we deﬁne





U i(di, αk, a−k)− U i(0, αk, a−k)
)
Πj 6=kρj [aj ] ≥ 0
which represents the greatest gain to any member of group k from deviating from the plan
αk given the play of the other groups. The condition for group incentive compatibility is
simply Gk(αk, ρ−k) = 0.




vk(ak, a−k)αk[ak]Πj 6=kρj [aj ]
Both functions are continuous in (αk, ρ−k) and if follows from the standard existence the-
orem for Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite games that for every ρ−k there exists a αk such that
Gk(αk, ρ−k) = 0. These properties together with Ak being a closed subset of Rk are the
properties that are used in the remainder of the paper. For example, we could take Ak to
be all correlated strategies by group k if we thought they had access to arbitrary correlating
devices, or we could take Ak to be the mixed strategy of a representative individual in a
homogeneous group if we thought such a group was restricted to anonymous play.9
3.2. Equilibrium
We now give our fundamental deﬁnition of collusion constrained equilibrium. As moti-
vation, let us try to capture the idea that groups may randomize because their beliefs about
the play of other groups are random. One possibility is to introduce an explicit random
belief model and work directly with equilibria in that model. We shall do this subsequently,
but we take a more direct approach here: we observe that when the degree of randomness is
small the set of equilibria does not depend very much on the randomization, and formalize
this by looking at the limit as randomness vanishes - a kind of Chesire cat model in which
9It is not be appropriate to assume Ak convex for the following reason. We want public randomizations
over incentive compatible plays. But a distribution over proﬁles which is a correlated equilibrium (hence
incentive compatible) with respect to some correlating device is not necessarily generated by public random-
ization over incentive compatible proﬁles. For example, a group which has no correlating devices available
and can only mix among action proﬁles cannot achieve the usual (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) distribution in the game of
chicken without violating incentive compatibility, because that distribution is obtainable only through the
public randomization that puts weight 1/3 on the three pure strategy proﬁles - which are not all incentive
compatible. However a convex Ak containing the pure proﬁles would also contain the above distribution
even if no correlating devices are available to the group. We must thus dispense with a convexity assumption
on Ak to properly account for incentive compatibility within groups.
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the cat (the randomization) disappears and only the grin (equilibrium) is left. In doing so,
our goal will be to provide a parsimonious model - one in which it is reasonably easy to
say what equilibria are, in which the set of equilibria is reasonably small, one which puts
weight only on the best equilibria at non-critical points. We shall subsequently show that
our notion of equilibrium captures the limits of a variety of perturbed models and that in
a sense all of these equilibria arise as limits of perturbed models.
Our preliminary goal, then, is to capture the idea that at critical points - where the group
best equilibrium correspondence according to vk is discontinuous - small random errors in
beliefs may lead to playing equilibria that are not the best at the critical point. This will
also ﬁll in the discontinuity, which will lead to an existence theorem. To implement this
program we must specify which randomizations over equilibria are allowed. Our approach
is to consider which is the worst of the best equilibria for nearby beliefs. No slightly random
belief would lead to a choice of an equilibrium that gives a smaller group utility than this.
Hence we consider the equilibria that give at least this reservation value of group utility.
This approach has the advantage that at critical points we need to compute just a single
number for each group, and then we allow arbitrary randomization over the equilibria that
give at least this group utility. As we shall see, this is relatively easy to work with.
Recall that Gk(αk, ρ−k) measures the greatest gain in utility to any group member of
deviating from the plan αk. The greatest incentive compatible group utility is given by
V k(ρ−k) = max
αk∈Ak|Gk(αk,ρ−k)=0
vk(αk, ρ−k)
For the solutions to this problem we have:
Deﬁnition 1. The group best response set Bk(ρ−k) is the set of plans αk satisfyingGk(αk, ρ−k) =
0 and vk(αk, ρ−k) = V k(ρ−k).
Here V k(ρ−k) has the role of a group reservation utility. Note that Bk(ρ−k) is closed.
We can then deﬁne
Deﬁnition 2. ρ ∈ R is a strict collusion constrained equilibrium if ρk ∈ H[Bk(ρ−k)] for all
k.
As we have seen in the example above these do not generally exist. Hence we now allow
perturbations of beliefs about the other groups plans, and deﬁne the worst best utility for





Observing that this is non-increasing in  we may take the limit to get just the grin and
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deﬁne V kS (ρ
−k) = lim→0 V k (ρ−k) as the group shadow reservation utility. Further observing
that as σ−k → ρ−k the incentive compatible plans at σ−k should converge to those at ρ−k
we are led to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3. The shadow response set BkS(ρ
−k) is the set of plans αk that satisfyGk(αk, ρ−k) =
0 and vk(αk, ρ−k) ≥ V kS (ρ−k). 10
Like Bk(ρ−k) we have BkS(ρ
−k) is closed. Note that since V kS (ρ
−k) ≤ V k(ρ−k) clearly
BkS(ρ
−k) ⊇ Bk(ρ−k). We know from example 1 that Bk(ρ−k) may fail to be upper hemi-
continuous. We show in the Appendix that by contrast the correspondence BkS(ρ
−k) must
be upper hemicontinuous. Consequently BkS(ρ
−k) = Bk(ρ−k) implies that Bk(ρ−k) is also
upper hemicontinuous at ρ−k and we say that ρ−k is a regular point for group k. Otherwise
we say that ρ−k is a critical point for group k.
We expect that limits of equilibria with random beliefs should place weight only on
BkS(ρ
−k) (which we will subsequently demonstrate) so we adopt the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4. ρ ∈ R is a collusion constrained equilibrium if ρk ∈ H[BkS(ρ−k)] for all k.
The key to collusion constrained equilibrium is that we allow plans in BkS(ρ
−k) not
merely in Bk(ρ−k). If in a collusion constrained equilibrium ρk /∈ H[Bk(ρ−k)] we say that
group k engages in shadow mixing. This means that the group puts positive probability on
equilibria in BkS(ρ
−k)\Bk(ρ−k) that are not the best possible.
Our example above shows that shadow mixing may be necessary in equilibrium as we
spell out next.
Example. [Example 1 revisited ] In the example we take k(1) = k(2) = 1, k(3) = 2. We
take group utility to be deﬁned by equal welfare weights β1 = β2 = 1.
To apply the deﬁnition of collusion constrained equilibrium we ﬁrst compute for group
k = 1 the best utility V 1(ρ2) where since there is one player ρ2 may be identiﬁed with α3.
For α3 ≤ 1/2 we know that the best equilibrium for group k = 1 is (C,C) with corresponding
group utility V 1(ρ2) = 12 + 8(1 − α3), while for α3 > 1/2 the only equilibrium is (D,D)
with group utility V 1(ρ2) = 4. For α3 6= 1/2 we have V 1S (ρ2) = V 1(ρ2), and the shadow
response and best response sets are the same: (C,C) for α3 < 1/2 and (D,D) for α3 > 1/2.
At α3 = 1/2 the worst best utility for nearby beliefs are those for α3 > 1/2 giving a group
utility of 4, whence the set of incentive compatible plans that give at least this utility are
the equilibria (C,C) and (D,D), that is B1S(ρ
2) = {(C,C), (D,D)}. For the group k = 2
consisting solely of individual 3 the shadow best response set is just the usual best response
set.
10The set BkS(ρ
−k) is a kind of shadow of nearby best equilibria - hence we refer to mixing over this shadow
as shadow mixing.
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Clearly there is no equilibrium with α3 6= 1/2. On the other hand when α3 = 1/2
the group can shadow-mix 50-50 between (C,C) and (D,D), leaving player 3 indiﬀerent
between C and D; so this is a collusion constrained equilibrium. We conclude that there is
a unique collusion constrained equilibria with ρ1 a 50-50 mixture over {(C,C), (D,D)} and
ρ2 a 50-50 mixture over {C,D}.
It should be apparent that collusion constrained equilibria use as correlating devices
only the private randomization device available to each player and the group randomiza-
tion device. We refer to correlated equilibria of the underlying game that use only these
randomizing devices as group correlated equilibria.
Theorem 1. Collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a subset of the group correlated
equilibria of the underlying game.
The theorem is proved in the Appendix.
4. Three Model Perturbations
We now study how collusion constrained equilibrium arises as a limit of equilibria in
perturbed models. This is useful in the same way that the non-cooperative Nash demand
game is useful in understanding the cooperative Nash bargaining solution. These equilibria
are standard in the sense that groups make best choices and there is no shadow mixing. In
each case such standard equilibria are shown to exist. We consider three diﬀerent types of
perturbations. First, as discussed above, we consider the possibility that group beliefs are
random. Second, we consider the possibility that incentive constraints can be overcome by a
costly enforcement technology. Finally, we consider the possibility that group decisions are
taken by a leader who has valence in the sense of being able to persuade group members to
do as he wishes, but that if he issues orders that are not followed he is punished. In each case
we take a limit as beliefs become less random, enforcement becomes more costly, or valence
shrinks and show that the limit of equilibria of the perturbed games are collusion constrained
equilibria in the unperturbed game. We emphasize that these are upper hemicontinuity
results, we do not show that every collusion constrained equilibrium arises this way. The
issue of lower hemicontinuity is considered subsequently.
4.1. Random Belief Equilibrium
We now show that collusion constrained equilibria are limit points of strict collusion
constrained equilibria when beliefs of each group about behavior of the other groups are
random and the randomness tends to vanish. We start by describing a random belief model.
The idea is that given the true play ρ−k of the other groups, there is a common belief σ−k
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by group k that is a random function of that true play. Notice that these random beliefs
are shared by the entire group - we could also consider individual belief perturbations, but
it is the common component that is of interest to us, because it is this that coordinates
group play. Conceptually if we think that a group colludes through some sort of discussions
that gives rise to common knowledge - looking each other in the eye, a handshake and so
forth - then it makes sense that during these discussions a consensus emerges not just on
what action to take, but underlying that choice, a consensus on what the other groups
are thought to be doing. We must emphasize: our model is a model of the consequences
of groups successfully colluding - we do not attempt to model the underlying processes of
communication, negotiation and consensus that leads to their successful collusion.
Deﬁnition 5. A density function fk(σ−k|ρ−k) is called a random group belief model if it is
continuous as a function of (σ−k, ρ−k) and for  > 0 we say that the random group belief
model is only -wrong if it satisﬁes
´
|σ−k−ρ−k|≤ f
k(σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k ≥ 1− .
In other words if the model is only -wrong then it places a low probability on being far
from the truth. In Web Appendix 2 we give for every positive  an example based on the
Dirichlet distribution of a random group belief model that is only -wrong . We also deﬁne
Deﬁnition 6. A group decision rule is a bk(ρ−k) ∈ H[Bk(ρ−k)], measurable as a function
of ρ−k.
Notice that for given beliefs ρ−k we are assuming that the group colludes on a response
in Bk(ρ−k) which is the set of the best choices for the group that satisfy the incentive
constraints, and does not choose points in BkS(ρ
−k)\Bk(ρ−k) as would be permitted by
shadow mixing.
Deﬁnition 7. For a group decision rule bk(ρ−k) and random group belief model fk(σ−k|ρ−k)
the group response function is the distribution F k(ρ−k)[ak] =
´
bk(σ−k)[ak]fk(σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k.
If we have rules and belief models for all groups then a ρ ∈ R that satisﬁes ρk = F k(ρ−k)
for all k is called a random belief equilibrium with respect to bk(ρ−k) and fk(σ−k|ρ−k).
In the Appendix the following is proved:
Theorem 2. If for each k we have group decision rules bk(ρ−k) and for each k and n
we have random group belief models fkn(σ
−k|ρ−k) that are only n-wrong then there exist
random belief equilibria ρn with respect to b
k(ρ−k) and fkn(σ
−k|ρ−k). Moreover if n → 0
and ρn → ρ then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Example (Beliefs equilibrium in example 1). In Web Appendix 1 we analyze the random
belief model corresponding to the Dirichlet belief model deﬁned in Web Appendix 2. The
ﬁgure below shows what the group response functions look like in our three player example.
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The key point is that the random belief equilibrium value of α3 lies below 1/2, that is, as
→ 0 the collusion constrained equilibrium is approached from the left and above.









4.2. Costly Enforcement Equilibrium
We now assume that each group k has a costly enforcement technology that it can use
to overcome incentive constraints. In particular, we assume that every plan αk is incentive
compatible provided that the group pays a cost C(αk, ρ−k) of carrying out the monitoring
and punishment needed to prevent deviation. Levine and Modica (2016) show how cost of
this type arise from peer discipline systems and Levine and Mattozzi (2016) study these
systems in the context of voting by collusive parties: we give an example below. We assume
Ck(αk, ρ−k) continuous in αk, ρ−k and adopt the following
Deﬁnition 8. A function Ck(αk, ρ−k) is an enforcement cost if Ck(αk, ρ−k) = 0 whenever
Gk(αk, ρ−k) = 0.
In other words enforcement is costly only if there is a deviation that needs to be deterred
and nearby plans have similar enforcement costs. A particular example of such a cost
function would be Ck(αk, ρ−k) = Gk(αk, ρ−k), that is, the cost of deterring a deviation
is equal to the biggest beneﬁt any player receives by deviating. Notice that we allow the
possibility that incentive incompatible plans have zero cost.
With this technology we deﬁne
Deﬁnition 9. The enforced group best response set Bk(ρ−k) is the set of plans αk such
that vk(αk, ρ−k)− Ck(αk, ρ−k) = maxα˜k∈Ak vk(α˜k, ρ−k)− Ck(α˜k, ρ−k).
Notice that again there is no shadow mixing here, just a choice of the group's best plan.
Then we have the usual deﬁnition of equilibrium
Deﬁnition 10. ρ ∈ R is a costly enforcement equilibrium if ρk ∈ H[Bk(ρ−k)].
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Notice that if the cost of enforcement is zero then the group can achieve the best outcome
ignoring incentive constraints, an assumption, as we indicated in the introduction, often used
by political economists and economic historians. We are interested in the opposite case in
which enforcing non-incentive compatible plans is very costly. We then deﬁne
Deﬁnition 11. A sequence Ckn(α
k, ρ−k) of cost functions is high cost if there are sequences
γkn → 0 and Γkn →∞ such that Gk(αk, ρ−k) > γkn implies Ckn(αk, ρ−k) ≥ Γkn.
In the Appendix we prove11
Theorem 3. Suppose Ckn(α
k, ρ−k) is a high cost sequence. Then for each n a costly en-
forcement equilibrium ρn exists, and if limn→∞ ρn → ρ then ρ is a collusion constrained
equilibrium.
Example 2. We give a simple example of a costly enforcement technology and a high cost
sequence based on Levine and Modica (2016). Speciﬁcally, we view the choice of αk by
group k as a social norm and assume that the group has a monitoring technology which
generates a noisy signal of whether or not an individual member i complies with the norm.
The signal is zi ∈ {0, 1} where 0 means good, followed the social norm and 1 means bad,
did not follow the social norm. Suppose further that if member i violates the social norm
by choosing αi 6= αk then the signal is 1 for sure while if he adhered to the social norm so
that αi = αk then the signal is 1 with probability pin. When the bad signal is received the
group member receives a punishment of size P i.12
It is convenient to deﬁne the individual version of the gain to deviating





U i(di, αk, a−k)− U i(0, αk, a−k)
)
Πj 6=kρj [aj ] ≥ 0.
For the social norm αk to be incentive compatible we need P i − pinP i ≥ Gi(αk, ρ−k) which
is to say P i ≥ Gi(αk, ρ−k)/(1− pin). If the social norm is adhered to, the social cost of the
punishment is pinP
i, and the group will collude to minimize this cost so that it will choose
P i = Gi(αk, ρ−k)/(1− pin). The resulting cost is then (pin/(1− pin))Gi(αk, ρ−k). Hence in
this model Ckn(α





k, ρ−k) = 0 if and only if Gk(αk, ρ−k) = maxi|k(i)=kGi(αk, ρ−k) = 0 it fol-
lows that Ckn(α
k, ρ−k) is an enforcement cost. We claim that as pin → 1, that is, as the
signal quality deteriorates, this is in fact a high cost sequence. Certainly Ckn(α
k, ρ−k) ≥
11Note that it is not important that Γkn → ∞, just that it be big enough that it would never be worth
paying such a high cost.
12Here the coercion takes the form of punishment - but it could equally well be the withholding of a
reward.
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(pin/(1− pin))Gk(αk, ρ−k). Choose γkn → 0 such that Γkn ≡ (pin/(1− pin)) γkn → ∞. Then
for Gk(αk, ρ−k) > γkn we have Ckn(αk, ρ−k) ≥ Γkn as required by the deﬁnition.
Example (Costly enforcement equilibrium in example 1). We use the high cost sequence
just deﬁned. In Web Appendix 1 we show that the costly enforcement equilibrium of our
three-player game consists of the group randomizing half half between CC and DD while
player 3 plays α3 = (4−3pin)/2 for all pin > 4/5. This equilibrium converges to the collusion
constrained equilibrium as pin → 1. Notice that the collusion constrained equilibrium value
of α3 = 1/2 is approached from the right while the group randomization in the costly
enforcement equilibrium is constant and equal to the limiting constrained equilibrium value.
Contrast this with the random belief model where the approach is from the left and above.
4.3. Leader/Evaluator Equilibrium
In this section we study a model of leadership and deﬁne a non-cooperative game that
respects incentive constraints. Leaders give their followers instructions - they tell them
things such as let's go on strike or let's vote against that law. The idea is that group
leaders serve as explicit coordinating devices for groups. Each group will have a leader who
tells group members what to do, and if he is to serve as an eﬀective coordinating device these
instructions cannot be optional. However, we do not want leaders to issue instructions that
members would not wish to follow - that is, that are not incentive compatible. Hence we
give them incentives to issue instructions that are incentive compatible by allowing group
members to punish their leader. Indeed, we do observe in practice that it is often the case
that groups follow orders given by a leader but engage in ex post evaluation of the leader's
performance.
The leader/evaluator game is governed by two positive parameters ν, P . The parameter
v measures the valence of a leader: this has a concrete interpretation as the amount of
utility that group members are ready to give up to follow the leader.13 Alternatively, ν can
be thought of as measuring group loyalty. The parameter P represents a punishment that
can be levied by a group member against the leader.14
Our non-cooperative game goes as follows:
Stage 1: Each leader privately chooses a plan αk ∈ Ak: conceptually these are orders
given to the members who must obey the orders.
13It is convenient notationally and for the statement of results that all leaders have the same valence;
this also implicitly assumes that followers of a leader are equally willing to sacriﬁce. This entails no loss of
generality since as long as the willingness to sacriﬁce is positive we can linearly rescale ui to units in which
willingness to sacriﬁce is the same.
14Again this might depend on k but we can rescale νk so that punishment is the same for all leaders.
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Stage 2: Each player i with k(i) = k serves as an evaluator and observing the plan αk
of the leader chooses a response di ∈ Ak ∪ {0}.
Payoﬀs: The evaluator receives utility ui(di, αk, α−k) if di 6= 0 and ui(0, αk, α−k) + ν if
di = 0, that is, he takes as given the other players in the group have followed orders and gets
a bonus of ν for acquiescing to the leader's plan. Let Qk denote the number of evaluators
who chose di 6= 0. The leader receives vk(αk, α−k) − PQk, that is, for each evaluator who
disagrees with his decision he is penalized by P . Note that the leader and evaluator do not
learn what the other groups did until the game is over.
Deﬁnition 12. We say that ρ is a Bayesian perfect equilibrium of the leader/evaluator
game if there are probability distributions µk over Ak for the leaders and measures ηi(αk)




(ii) µk is optimal for the leader given ρ−k and ηi
(iii) for all αk ∈ Ak and evaluators i the measure ηi(αk) is optimal for the evaluator
given αk and ρ−k.
Note that (iii) embodies the idea of no signaling what you do not know 15 that beliefs
about the play of leaders of other groups is independent of the plan chosen by the leader of
the own group.16
For this game to have an interesting relation to collusion constrained equilibrium, two
things should be true.
• The evaluators must be able to punish the leader enough to prevent him from choosing
incentive incompatible plans. A suﬃcient condition is that the punishment is greater
than any possible gain in the game, that is, P > max vk(αk, α−k)−min vk(αk, α−k).
• The leader should be able to avoid punishment by choosing an incentive compatible
plan. However the leader can only guarantee avoiding punishment if the evaluators
strictly prefer not to deviate from his plan. If ν = 0 this is true only for plans that
are strictly incentive compatible and such plans may not exist. Hence the assumption
ν > 0 is crucial: it assures that the leader can always avoid punishment by choosing
an incentive compatible plan.
The following result is proved in the Appendix.
15It is known for ﬁnite games that this is an implication of sequentiality and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
use this condition to deﬁne Bayesian perfect equilibrium for a class of games. Since the leader/evaluator
game is not ﬁnite sequentiality is complicated. Hence it seems most straightforward to follow Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and deﬁne Bayesian perfect directly with the no signaling what you do not know condition.
16Since the leader has know way of knowing if other leaders have deviated he should not be able to signal
this through his own choice of action.
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Theorem 4. Suppose νn → 0 and Pn > max vk(αk, α−k)−min vk(αk, α−k). Then for each n
a Bayesian perfect equilibrium ρn of the leader/evaluator game exists, and if limn→∞ ρn = ρ
then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Example (Leader/Evaluator equilibrium in example 1). For α3 < 1/2, playing CC is
incentive compatible for the group, the question is how much can they mix out of the
unique bad equilibrium DD when α3 > 1/2 given that they are willing to forgo gains not
larger than ν. Web Appendix 1 shows that the equilibrium is αˆ3 = (2+ν)/4 > 1/2 and that
the group shadow mixes between the unique mixture αˆ1 = αˆ2 that is the smaller solution
of −4(αˆ1)2(1− αˆ3) + 2αˆ1 = ν and CC with probability
0.5− (αˆ1)2
(1− (αˆ1)2)
on CC. Note that as ν → 0 we have αˆ1 → 0 so that in the limit the group shadow mixes
between CC and DD as expected. Notice also that α3 > 1/2 so that the solution is on the
same side of 1/2 as the costly enforcement equilibrium, but the opposite side of the belief
equilibrium. The solution diﬀers from both, however in that the group does not randomize
between CC and DD, but rather between CC and a mixed strategy.
5. Reﬁnements of Collusion Constrained Equilibrium
In the perturbations we have considered the result is always that the limit of the per-
turbation is a collusion constrained equilibria. If there are several such equilibria, do the
diﬀerent limits converge to the same equilibrium? Not always. In this section we present an
example with a continuum of collusion constrained equilibria each of which can be obtained
as the limit of an appropriately chosen perturbation.
The example is a variation of Example 1, where player 3 gets zero for sure if he plays
C, and the good equilibrium in the coordination game for the group which results if player
3 plays D is only weakly incentive compatible.
Example 3. The matrix on the left below contains the payoﬀs if player 3 plays C, the right
one results if she plays D:
C D
C 6, 6, 0 0, 8, 0
D 8, 0, 0 2, 2, 0
C D
C 8, 8, 0 0, 8, 5
D 8, 0, 5 2, 2, 5
In this game clearly player 3 must play D with probability 1: if he plays C with any positive
probability then it is strictly dominant for players 1 and 2 to play D in which case player 3
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strictly prefers to playD. When player 3 playsD players 1 and 2 have exactly two equilibria:
CC and DD; and any mix between them is a collusion constrained equilibrium. To see this
observe that independently of the utility weights entering v1, for any belief perturbation
around α3 = 0 the worst equilibrium for the group is always DD so V 1S (α
3 = 0) is the utility
the group obtains in that equilibrium. Thus any mixture between DD and CC satisﬁes the
equilibrium condition, where of course in all strictly mixed equilibria the group gets utility
higher than V 1S .
Now consider the perturbations. For any random beliefs C has positive probability so
the group must play DD, so the only limit of random belief equilibria is DD. For costly
collusion equilibrium on the other hand the better equilibrium CC for the group has zero
cost so that will be chosen: the unique limit in this case is CC. Finally, for leadership
equilibrium since the compliance bonus ν is positive again CC will be chosen, the unique
limit is again CC.
This example is non-generic because it depends heavily on the fact that when player 3
plays a pure strategy D players 1 and 2 are indiﬀerent to deviating from CC. If we try
to construct an example of this type in the interior then players 1 and 2 must shadow mix
in the correct way to make player 3 indiﬀerent and this should pin down what the shadow
mixture must be. In the example we get around this by assuming that the pure strategy
for player 3 is a strict best response so that there are a continuum of shadow mixtures by
1 and 2 that are consistent with player 3 playing D.
6. Lower HemiContinuity
Roughly speaking, when we consider a perturbation such as random belief equilibrium,
leadership equilibrium, or costly enforcement equilibrium we are exhibiting a degree of
agnosticism about the model we have written down. That is we recognize that our model
is an imperfect representation but hopefully reasonable approximation of a more complex
reality and ask whether our equilibrium might be a good description of what happens in that
more complex reality. This is the spirit behind reﬁnements such as trembling hand perfection
and concepts such as Harsanyi (1973)'s notion of puriﬁcation of a mixed equilibrium. It is
the question addressed by Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988) who show how reﬁnements
do not capture the equilibria of all nearby games. We have shown that collusion constrained
equilibrium does a good job of capturing random beliefs, costly enforcement and leadership
equilibria. We know by example that there may be collusion constrained equilibria that do
not arise as a limit of any of these. We now ask whether for a given collusion constrained
equilibrium there is a story we can tell in the form of a perturbation representing a more
complex reality that justiﬁes the particular collusion constrained equilibrium.
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Each of the perturbations we have considered has embodied a story or justiﬁcation about
why groups might be playing the way they are playing. We now consider a richer class of
perturbations that combines elements of beliefs with costly enforcement and a perturbation
of the group objective function. Speciﬁcally, we use the following:
Deﬁnition 13. A perturbation for each group k consists of a continuous belief perturba-
tion r−kk (ρ
−k) ∈ R−k, an enforcement cost function function Ck(αk, ρ−k) and a continu-
ous objective function wk(αk, ρ−k). A perturbed equilibrium ρ is deﬁned by the condition
ρk ∈ H[arg maxαk wk(αk, r−kk (ρ−k))− Ck(αk, r−kk (ρ−k))].
The belief perturbation is a simpliﬁcation of the random belief model which assumed
that beliefs were random but near correct most of the time. Now we are going to assume
that they are deterministic and near correct. As does the random belief model it allows
that beliefs are slightly wrong and does not require that two groups agree about the play of
a third. The model of costly enforcement is exactly the same model we studied earlier. In
addition we are now agnostic about the group objective and allow the possibility that the
model may be slightly wrong in this respect. From a technical point of view it helps get rid
of non-generic examples. As we are only interested in small perturbations we deﬁne




n is said to converge if maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k)−
ρ−k| → 0, if Ckn is a high cost sequence, and if maxαk,ρ−k |wkn(αk, ρ−k) − vk(αk, ρ−k)| → 0.
We say that ρ is justiﬁable if there is a convergent sequence of perturbations together with
perturbed equilibria ρn → ρ.
Our main result proven in the Appendix is
Theorem 5. A perturbed equilibrium exists for any perturbation, and ρ is justiﬁable if and
only if it is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
7. A Voting Participation Game
What diﬀerence do groups make? Collusion constrained equilibria are a subset of the set
of group correlated equilibria, so we should expect that often the equilibria that are rejected
are going to have better eﬃciency properties than those that are accepted. However, that
comparison is not so interesting because it is the fact that the group is collusive that
enables it to randomize privately from the other groups - that is, coordinate their play.17
A more useful comparison is to ask what happens if the players play as individuals without
17The random belief model, in particular, only makes sense if the group is colluding, otherwise how can
they agree on their beliefs?
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correlating devices to coordinate their play, versus what happens if they are in collusive
groups. To keep things clean we will assume that the group has no correlating device
except for public randomization. In addition to static Nash equilibrium a second useful
benchmark is to analyze the case in which there is free (costless) enforcement - so that
incentive constraints do not matter.
Our setting for studying the economics of collusion is a voter participation game. We
start with a relatively standard Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)/Levine and Mattozzi (2016)
framework: there are two parties, the large party has two voters, players 1 and 2, the
small party one voter, player 3. Voters always vote for their own party, but is is costly to
vote - a cost we normalize to 1 - and voters may choose whether or not to vote. The party
that wins receives a transfer payment from the losing party. We assume that the cost or
beneﬁt to each member of the large party is τ > 0 so that the cost or beneﬁt to the small
party member is 2τ . Usually it is assumed that a tie means that each party has a 50%
chance of winning the prize, meaning that the election is a wash and no transfer payment is
made. In case nobody votes we maintain this assumption that the status quo is unchanged
and everyone gets 0. But when voting does take place it is often not the case in practice
that a tie is innocuous - it may result in a deadlocked government or in conﬂict between the
parties. So we we assume that a tie where each party casts one vote results in a deadlock
that is - for simplicity - just as bad as a loss.
The payoﬀs can be written in bi-matrix form. If player 3 does not vote the payoﬀ matrix
for the actions of players 1 and 2 (where 0 represents do not vote and 1 represents vote) is
1 0
1 τ − 1, τ − 1,−2τ τ − 1, τ,−2τ
0 τ, τ − 1,−2τ 0, 0, 0
This is not a prisoner's dilemma game between players 1 and 2, but it does have a unique
dominant strategy equilibrium at which neither votes. If player 3 does vote the payoﬀ
matrix for the actions of players 1 and 2 becomes
1 0
1 τ − 1, τ − 1,−2τ − 1 −τ − 1,−τ,−2τ − 1
0 −τ,−τ − 1,−2τ − 1 −τ,−τ, 2τ − 1
If τ > 1/2 this is a coordination game for player 1 and 2 due to the fact that a tie is as bad
as a loss: for a large party member not voting and having a tie results in −τ while voting
and winning results in τ − 1 > −τ . Similarly voting and having a tie is as bad as a loss
−τ − 1 and it would be better to not vote and lose, suﬀering the same loss but not paying
the cost of voting.
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We now summarize the structure of collusion constrained, Nash and free enforcement
equilibria in this model, with the full analysis in Web Appendix 3. There are a number of
equilibria of diﬀerent kinds: (i) an equilibrium N where nobody votes (only for τ < 1/2);
(ii) an equilibrium L in which player 3 does not vote and the large group wins by casting
a single vote. In the case of Nash there is also (iii) an equilibrium S in which only player
3 votes (and wins); (iv) equilibria L2, L3 where player 3 plays a pure strategy and the
group members randomize with positive probability on both voting and not voting; (v) a
fully mixed equilibrium M in which the large group members randomize as in the previous
case (v) two asymmetric mixed equilibria A in which only one of the group members votes
with positive probability. In the case of collusion constrained equilibrium (CCE) and free
enforcement equilibria (FEE) there are two types of equilibria with player 3 mixing, which
in the CCE case involve shadow mixing: (vi) m1 and M1 in which the large group either
stays out or casts a single vote; and (vii) m2 and M2 in which the large group either stays
out or casts two votes. In all the equilibria where player 3 mixes the probability that neither
group member votes is always ρ1[0, 0] = 1/2τ .
We deﬁne τ˜ ≡ 1/(3 − √5) ≈ 1.31. The entire set of equilibria is then given by the
following table calculated in Web Appendix 3.
lower τ upper τ CCE Nash FEE
0 1/2 N N N
1/2 3/4 m2 S L,M1,M2
3/4 1 m2 S L
1 τ˜ m2,m1, L S, L,A L
τ˜ 3/2 m2,m1, L S, L,M,A,L3 L
3/2 2 L S,L, L3 L
2 ∞ L S,L, L2, L3 L
The model has elements of both external and internal conﬂict. There is conﬂict between
the groups as each hopes to get the transfer. There is also conﬂict within the large group as
each prefers that the other votes. There are two sources of ineﬃciency in the model: total
welfare (the sum of the utilities of the all three players) is reduced if players vote and is
further reduced if there is a tie with one player from each group voting.
There are several basic points. If τ < 1/2 then it is strictly dominant for player 3 not to
vote: if the group casts no votes not voting gives 0 rather than τ − 1, and if the group does
cast votes then voting has no eﬀect or results in an undesirable tie. Given that player 3 is
not voting and τ < 1/2 it is optimal both for player 1 and player 2 individually not to vote
and for the group as a whole for neither of them to vote - there is no conﬂict here between
individual incentives and group goals. Hence - in all types of equilibrium, CCE, Nash and
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FEE when τ < 1/2 the unique equilibrium involves no voting and this is eﬃcient.
The interesting case is what happens when the stakes increase to τ > 1/2. Here it
cannot be an equilibrium for nobody to vote because in this case player 3 would prefer to
vote. Of particular interest are the S and L equilibria: these are always the best for the
small and large group respectively. To see this, observe that the best that can happen if
nobody in a group votes is to get 0. On the other hand the best thing that can happen if
a group casts at least one vote is that it casts only one vote and it wins, in which case the
group gets 2τ −1. When τ > 1/2 this is better than not voting. In the equilibrium S and L
in which exactly one player votes total welfare is always −1 reﬂecting the cost of the single
vote that is cast.
Additional observations from Web Appendix 3 are the following. There are a few pa-
rameter ranges where there are equilibria giving higher welfare than the S,L value of −1:
for FEE the M1 when it exists gives higher welfare; for CCE m1 gives higher welfare in the
range 1 ≤ τ ≤ 9/8. All remaining equilibria give welfare less than −1. In the Nash case S
is always an equilibrium and indeed for τ < 1 this is the only equilibrium. By contrast in
CCE and FEE the small player always gets a negative utility. Moreover in both cases when
the stakes τ are high enough the only equilibrium is L - although this occurs for a smaller
value of τ for FEE than CCE.
In the range 3/4 < τ < 1 equilibrium of all types is unique. The Nash equilibrium is S
and the FEE is L. The CCE is less eﬃcient than either, but the large group does better
than S and does worse than L. In this range as the stakes τ increase the probability of both
members of the large group voting, the probability of everyone voting and the probability
of the large group winning all increase, while total welfare decreases.
In the range 1/2 < τ < 3/2 shadow mixing is a possibility for CCE and for 1/2 < τ < 1
there is a unique CCE with shadow mixing m2. In the shadow mixing equilibria the small
group does better than at L while the large group does worse than L.
In a rough sense Nash is best for the small group, FEE is best for the large group and
CCE is in between. This rough in between picture also emerges in the sense that CCE
changes more gradually in favor of the large group as τ increases than does FEE.
It is interesting to compare m2 and M2 in the range 1/2 < τ < 3/4, the former for
CCE and the latter for FEE. In both equilibria the group mixes the same way, but the
third player must vote more frequently in CCE than in FEE. The reason is that if the third
player votes too infrequently then the incentive constraint fails when both members of the
group vote.
One observation of interest is that there are CCE and FEE that give the large group
more utility but a lower probability of winning. Speciﬁcally in 1/2 < τ < 3/4 for FEE we
have that M1 is better for the large group than M2 but gives them a smaller probability
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of winning, and the same is true for CCE in the range 1 < τ < τ˜ for the shadow mixing
equilibria m1and m2.
Finally, with respect to welfare of the large group we have computed it in the obvious
way as expected utility. For shadow mixing whether or not this is correct depends on
the underlying model - with random beliefs it is correct. However in costly enforcement
equilibrium shadow mixing appears as actual mixing, meaning that the group must be
indiﬀerent between the alternatives. In m1 and m2 staying out is strictly worse than casting
either one or two votes. Hence in the costly enforcement equilibrium the cost of overcoming
the incentive constraints to allow the casting of votes must exactly equal the diﬀerence in
utility between casting the votes and staying out: that is to say, all the gain from vote
casting must be dissipated in enforcement cost. Hence, in the limit, we should evaluate the
utility of the group as the least utility of proﬁles over which shadow mixing occurs - that
is to say, the utility from staying out. From Web Appendix 3 we know that the expected
utility to the large group in m1,m2 is 3− 2τ − 12τ and −3 + 2τ + 12τ respectively while the
probability of player 3 not voting is 1τ and 1 − 1τ respectively. Hence the utility of staying
out is 2(1 − τ) and −2 respectively and this is the appropriate utility for the large group.
In particular in the range 1 ≤ τ ≤ 9/8 it is no longer true that m1 does better from an
overall welfare perspective than L and S.
In the leadership case the utility assigned to a group when shadow mixing is ambiguous.
From the perspective of the followers the correct calculation is expected utility. From the
perspective of the leader the correct calculation is the least utility of proﬁles over which
shadow mixing occurs - from the leader's point of view the punishment needed to make him
indiﬀerent dissipates the beneﬁt of the better proﬁles. One may wonder why anyone would
agree to be leader given that they get less utility than the followers. Although a discussion
of who leaders are and why they are leaders is beyond the scope of this paper it is natural
to imagine they get some additional compensation from the group for agreeing to be leader.
In this case the follower utility seems the most relevant.
8. Conclusion
We study exogenously speciﬁed collusive groups and argue strongly that the right
notion of equilibrium is that of collusion constrained equilibrium. We start from the obser-
vation that groups such as political, ethnic, business or religious groups often collude. We
adopt the simple assumption that a group will collude on the within-group equilibrium that
best satisﬁes group objectives. We ﬁnd that this seemingly innocuous assumption disrupts
existence of equilibrium in simple games. We show that the existence problem is due to a
discontinuity of the equilibrium set, and propose a ﬁx which builds on the presumption
that a group cannot be assumed to be able to play a particular within-group equilibrium
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with certainty when at that equilibrium the incentive constraints are satisﬁed with equality.
This tremble implies that the group may put positive probability on actions which give
group members lower utility but are strictly incentive compatible. We show that the result-
ing equilibrium notion has strong robustness properties and indeed is both upper and lower
hemicontinuous with respect to a class of perturbations. This makes collusion constrained
equilibrium a strong foundation for analyzing exogenous groups (including dynamic mod-
els where people ﬂow between exogenous groups based on economic incentives as in the
Acemoglu (2001) farm lobby model), which in some sense is the case that Olson (1965)
had in mind and is of key importance in much of the political economy literature. This is
not to argue that endogenous group formation is not of interest - but it is important to
understand what happens as a consequence of group formation before building models of
group formation and collusion constrained equilibrium is step in that direction.
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Appendix: Continuity, Limits and Existence
Lemma 1. Suppose we have a sequence of sets Bkn, correlated proﬁles ρ
−k
n → ρ−k, scalars
V kn and positive numbers γ
k
n → 0 satisfying for any αkn ∈ Bkn
1. Gk(αkn, ρ
−k
n ) ≤ γkn
2. vk(αkn, ρ
−k
n ) ≥ V kn
If Bk is the set of αk ∈ Bk that satisﬁes
1. Gk(αk, ρ−k) = 0
2. vk(αk, ρ−k) ≥ lim inf V kn
then for any ρkn ∈ H(Bkn) with ρkn → ρk it is the case that ρk ∈ H(Bk)
Proof. Since Gk, vk are continuous the closure of Bkn satisﬁes the same inequalities so it
suﬃces to prove the result for closed sets Bkn.





n is closed Ak\Bkn is open and we can extend the measure
to all of Ak by taking µkn[Ak\Bkn] = 0. Since Ak is compact we may extract a weakly
convergent subsequence that converges to µk and without loss of generality may assume
the original sequence has this property. Because µkn → µk it follows from weak convergence
that ρk =
´
σµk(dσ). The result will follow if we can show that µk[Bk] = 1.
Consider the sets Bkv for which v
k(αk, ρ−k) ≥ lim inf V kn and Bk0 for which Gk(αk, ρ−k) =
0. We will show that µk[Bkv ] = 1 and µ
k[Bk0 ] = 1 from which it follows that µ
k[Bk] =
µk[Bkv ∩Bk0 ] = 1.
For Bkv let  > 0 and let D
k
v be the set v
k(αk, ρ−k) < lim inf V kn − . For n suﬃciently
large Dkv ∩Bkn = ∅, so µkn[Dkv] = 0. However since vk is continuous Dkv is an open set and




v] > 0, a contradiction. We
conclude that for all  > 0 we have µk[Dkv] = 0, so indeed µ
k[Bkv ] = 1 .
For Bk0 let  > 0 and let D
k
0be the set G
k(αk, ρ−k) > . Because Ak × R−k is compact
Gk(αk, ρ−k) is uniformly continuous so Gk(·, ρ−kn ) converges uniformly to Gk(·, ρ−k). Hence
for n suﬃciently large αk ∈ Bk0 implies Gk(αk, ρ−kn ) > /2 and since γkn → 0 also for
suﬃciently large n this implies µkn[D
k
0] = 0. However, since G
k is continuous Dk0 is an open




0] > 0 a contradiction.
We conclude that for all  > 0 we have µk[Dk0] = 0, so indeed µ
k[Bk0 ] = 1 .
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Corollary 1. Let the sets Bkn be deﬁned by G
k(αkn, ρ
−k
n ) ≤ γkn and vk(αkn, ρ−kn ) ≥ V kn(ρ−kn ).
If γkn, n → 0 and ρkn ∈ H(Bkn)→ ρk for all k then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Proof. If n ≤ /2 and |ρ−kn − ρ−k| ≤ /2 then |σ−kn − ρ−kn | ≤ n implies |σ−kn − ρ−k| ≤ 
whence V kn(ρ
−k
n ) ≥ V k (ρ−k). This gives lim inf V kn(ρ−kn ) ≥ V kS (ρ−k). Therefore taking




n ), Lemma 1 shows that ρ
k is contained in the convex hull of a set contained
in BkS(ρ
−k) for all k, whence the conclusion.
Collusion Constrained Equilibrium
Theorem 6 (Theorem 1 in text). Collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a subset of
the set of group correlated equilibria of the game.
Proof. For any sequence of correlated proﬁles ρ−kn → ρ−k, let γkn = 0 and let V kn = V kS (ρkn).
Notice that lim inf V kn ≥ V kS (ρk). Then by Lemma 1 we know that the convex hull of the
shadow best response set, H(BkS(ρ
−k)) is UHC. Existence of collusion constrained equilibria
then follows from Kakutani. The fact that collusion constrained equilibria are group cor-
related equilibria follows from the fact that the incentive constraints are satisﬁed for each
individual given signals generated by the private and group randomizing devices.
Random Belief Equilibria
Theorem 7 (Theorem 2 in text). If for each k we have group decision rules bk(ρ−k) and for
each k and n we have random group belief models fkn(σ
−k|ρ−k) that are only n-wrong then
there exist random belief equilibria ρn with respect to b
k(ρ−k) and fkn(σ
−k|ρ−k). Moreover
if n → 0 and ρn → ρ then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Proof. Remember that ρkn(a




is continuous as a function of ρ−k. So ρkn(ak) is a continuous function of ρ−k by the Domi-
nated Convergence Theorem, for every ak . Existence then follows from the Brouwer ﬁxed
point theorem.






































Now assume n → 0. By assumption ekn(ρ−k)→ 1 and ρkn → ρk it follows that ρkn → ρk.
Take then Bkn ≡ {αk ∈ Bk(σ−k)||σ−k − ρ−kn | ≤ n}. Clearly ρkn ∈ H(Bkn). We now show
that the sequence (ρkn, ρ
−k
n ) satisﬁes the hypotheses of Corollary 1. For any α
k
n ∈ Bkn there is






we see that Gk(αkn, ρ
−k
n ) ≤ γkn. Since Gk is continuous on a compact set it is uniformly
continuous so γkn → 0. Moreover if αkn ∈ Bkn then clearly vk(αkn, ρ−kn ) ≥ V kn(ρ−kn ). The
result now follows from Corollary 1.
Leadership Equilibrium
For ν > 0 deﬁne V kν (ρ
−k) = supαk∈Ak|Gk(αk,ρ−k)<ν vk(αk, ρ−k) and Bkν (ρ−k) to be the
set of plans αk satisfying Gk(αk, ρ−k) ≤ ν and vk(αk, ρ−k) ≥ V kν (ρ−k).
Deﬁnition 15. We say that ρ is a strict ν- equilibrium if ρk ∈ H[Bkν (ρ−k)] for all k.
Theorem 8. Strict ν- equilibria exist.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that Bkν is UHC. By Theorem 17.35 in Aliprantis and Border
(2007) we then know that H[Bkν (ρ
−k)] is also UHC. Existence of strict ν- equilibrium then
follows by Kakutani's ﬁxed point theorem.
Consider a sequence (αkn, ρ
−k
n ) such that α
k
n ∈ Bkν (ρ−kn ). Suppose that limn→∞ αkn = αk
and limn→∞ ρ−kn = ρk. By continuity, Gk(αkn, ρ−kn ) ≤ ν for all n implies that Gk(αk, ρ−k) ≤
ν. Suppose by contradiction, vk(αk, ρ−k) < V kν (ρ−k). By the continuity of vk it follows
that for suﬃciently large n we have vk(αkn, ρ
−k
n ) < V
k
ν (ρ
−k). Since vk(αkn, ρ−kn ) ≥ V kν (ρ−kn )
this implies V kν (ρ
−k
n ) < V
k
ν (ρ
−k). Hence there is some αˆk such that Gk(αˆk, ρ−k) < ν and
V kν (ρ
−k
n ) < v
k(αˆk, ρ−k). By continuity of Gk and vk this in turn implies that for suﬃciently




Theorem 9. ρ is a Bayesian perfect equilibrium of the leader evaluator game if and only
if it is a strict ν-equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ρ is Bayesian perfect. Let µk and ηi be the corresponding leader and
evaluator strategies. It suﬃces to show that µk[Bkν (ρ
−k)] = 1. Denote the equilibrium
utility of leader k by Uk.
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Let Dkν be the subset of Ak for which Gk(αk, ρ−k) > ν. For αk ∈ Dkν there is an i with
k(i) = k for whom it is optimal to choose ηi(αk)[αk] = 0, hence utility for the leader is at
most max vk − P for those choices of αk. Suppose d = µk[Dkν ] > 0. Let αˆk ∈ Ak satisfy
Gk(αˆk, ρ−k) = 0 which we know exists. Consider µˆk that takes the weight from Dkv and
puts it on αˆk. The utility from µˆk is at least (1−d)Uk+d(Uk+min vk−max vk+P ) which
is bigger than Uk since P > max vk −min vk. Hence d = 0.
Let now Dkν be the subset of Ak for which vk(αk, ρ−k) < V kν (ρ−k) − . Let αˆk ∈ Ak
satisfy Gk(αˆk, ρ−k) < ν and vk(αˆk, ρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k) − /2 which we know exists. By
evaluator optimality we have ηi(αˆk)[αˆk] = 1 for all k(i) = k. Consider µˆk that takes the
weight from Dkv and puts it on αˆ
k. The utility from µˆk is at least Uk + d/2 so again d = 0.
This shows that indeed µk[Bkν (ρ
−k)] = 1.
Now suppose that ρ is a strict ν-equilibrium. Since ρk ∈ H[Bkν (ρ−k)] there exist measures
µk with µk[Bkν (ρ
−k)] = 1 and ρk =
´
σµk(dσ) so it suﬃces to ﬁnd ηi that together with µk
form a Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Let αˆi(α−k) ∈ arg maxαi ui(αi, αk, ρ−k) be measurable.
Observe that it cannot be that Gk(αk, ρ−k) < ν and vk(αk, ρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k), so consider
the following evaluator optimal choice of ηi
(i) if Gk(αk, ρ−k) > ν then ηi[αˆi(α−k)] = 1 and note that in this case αˆi(α−k) 6= αi for
at least one i
(ii) if Gk(αk, ρ−k) ≤ ν and vk(αk, ρ−k) ≤ V kν (ρ−k) then ηi[αi] = 1
(iii) if Gk(αk, ρ−k) = ν and vk(αk, ρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k) some evaluator j is indiﬀerent
between αj and some α˜j 6= αj (and this evaluator can be chosen in a measurable way).
For i 6= j take ηi[αi] = 1. For j choose ηj [α˜j ] = (vk(αk, ρ−k)− V kν (ρ−k)) /P and ηj [αj ] =
1− ηj [α˜j ].
Then if αk ∈ Bkν (ρ−k) the leader utility is exactly V kν (ρ−k), while if Gk(αk, ρ−k) > ν
then leader utility is at most max vk −P . Hence αk is at least as good as any other choice,
and indiﬀerent to any other choice in Bkν (ρ
−k). It follows that µk is optimal for leader k.
Lemma 2. V kν (ρ








vk(αk, ρ−k) = V k(ρ−k) ≥ V k (ρ−k)
the stated inequality follows.
Theorem 10. If ρn is a sequence of strict νn-equilibria, νn → 0 and ρn → ρ then ρ is a
collusion constrained equilibrium.
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Proof. Let γn = νn and notice that for any α
k
n ∈ Bkνn(ρ−kn ) we have vk(αkn, ρ−kn ) ≥ V kνn(ρ−kn ) ≥
V kn(ρ
−k
n ) by Lemma 2 for some sequence n → 0. Result now follows from Corollary 1.
Perturbed Equilibrium: Existence and Upper HemiContinuity
Theorem 11. A perturbed equilibrium exists for any perturbation.
Proof. Notice that for any perturbation wk(αk, r−kk (ρ
−k))−Ck(αk, r−kk (ρ−k)) is continuous




−k)) to be UHC. In turn by Theorem 17.35 in Aliprantis and Border (2007),
H[arg maxαk w
k(αk, r−kk (ρ
−k))−Ck(αk, r−kk (ρ−k))] is UHC. Existence of perturbed equilib-
ria then follows from the Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem.
Theorem 12. If ρ is justiﬁable then it is a collusion constrained equilibrium.





such that maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k)−ρ−k| → 0, Ckn is a high cost sequence, and maxαk,ρ−k |wkn(αk, ρ−k)−
vk(αk, ρ−k)| → 0, each with a perturbed equilibrium ρn that converges to ρ.




−k)) − Ckn(αk, r−kkn (ρ−k)). Let v˜ = max vk −min vk.
Let δn1 = maxαk,ρ−k |wkn(αk, r−kkn (ρ−k)) − wkn(αk, ρ−k)| and δn2 = maxαk,ρ−k |wkn(αk, ρ−k) −
vk(αk, ρ−k)|. Since Ckn is a high cost sequence, for all large enough n, Gk(αk, ρ−k) > γkn
would imply Ckn(α
k, ρ−k) > 2(v˜ + δn1 + δn2) and since maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k) − ρ−k| → 0, also
Ckn(α
k, r−kkn (ρ
−k)) > v˜+δn1+δn2. So for all such n, αk ∈ Bkwcn would meanGk(αk, ρ−k) ≤ γkn.
LetW kn (ρ




−k)). Suppose αkn ∈ Bkwcn; then






−k)) ≥W kn (ρ−k) ≥ V kS (ρ−k)− δn1 − δn2
This in turn means
vk(αkn, ρ
−k) ≥W kn (ρ−k)− δn1 − δn2 ≥ V kS (ρ−k)− 2δn1 − 2δn2
Notice that the sets Bkwcn therefore satisfy the premise of Lemma 1 if we set the scalars
V kn equal toW
k
n (ρ
−k)−δn1−δn2. So we know that ρ must be such that for all k, ρk ∈ H(Bk)
where Bk is the set of αk that satisﬁesGk(αk, ρ−k) = 0 and vk(αk, ρ−k) ≥ lim inf V kn . Finally
note that
lim inf W kn (ρ
−k)− δn1 − δn2 ≥ lim inf V kS (ρ−k)− 2δn1 − 2δn2 ⇒ lim inf W kn (ρ−k) ≥ V kS (ρ−k).
ρ is therefore a collusion constrained equilibrium.
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Perturbed Equilibrium: Lower HemiContinuity
Theorem 13. If ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium then it is justiﬁable.
Proof. We are given a collusion constrained equilibrium ρ and want to ﬁnd a sequence of per-
turbations with perturbed equilibria ρn → ρ. In fact the construction we are going to suggest
will do something stronger, the idea is to construct a series of perturbations with perturbed
equilibria ρ which obviously converges to itself. Recall that ρk ∈ H[BkS(ρ−k)]. The idea is




−k)) − Ckn(αk, r−kk (ρ−k)) =
BkS(ρ
−k); then clearly ρk itself is in H[arg maxαk wkn(αk, r
−k
k (ρ
−k))− Ckn(αk, r−kk (ρ−k))].
Step 1: Choose, for each k, a sequence σ−kkn with σ
−k
kn → ρ−k and V k(σ−kkn )→ V kS (ρ−k).
We know that we can ﬁnd such a sequence by the deﬁnition of V kS (ρ
−k): it is the limit of




(σ−k) = maxαk |Gk(αk, σ−k) − Gk(αk, ρ−k)|, Gkn = Gk(σ−kkn ), and
similarly V (σ−k) = max{0, V k(σ−k) − V kS (ρ−k)}, V
k
n = V (σ
−k





n go to zero as n → ∞. Also let vk(σ−k) = maxαk |vk(αk, σ−k) − vk(αk, ρ−k)|
and vkn = v
k(σ−kkn ); observe that v
k

















λkn which goes to zero.
The functions wkn(α
k, σ−k) and Ckn(αk, σ−k): Deﬁne ﬁrstDkn(αk) = max{0, vk(αk, ρ−k)−
V kS (ρ
−k)}+λknG(αk, ρ−k) and dkn(αk) = min{Dkn(αk), κkn}. This converges uniformly to zero.
We then take C
k
n(α
k, σ−k) = Dkn(αk) − dkn(αk) and wkn(αk, σ−k) = vk(αk, ρ−k) − dkn(αk).
Observe that
wkn(α
k, σ−k)− Ckn(αk, σ−k) =vk(αk, ρ−k)−Dkn(αk)
=vk(αk, ρ−k)−max{0, vk(αk, ρ−k)− V kS (ρ−k)} − λknG(αk, ρ−k)
= min{vk(αk, ρ−k), V kS (ρ−k)} − λknG(αk, ρ−k)
Key fact : arg maxαk w
k
n(α
k, σ−k) − Ckn(αk, σ−k) = BkS(ρ−k). To see this consider the
maximizers of min{vk(αk, ρ−k), V kS (ρ−k)} − λknG(αk, ρ−k). For the elements of BkS(ρ−k),
that is the αk for which G(αk, ρ−k) = 0 and vk(αk, ρ−k) ≥ V kS (ρ−k), the expression equals
V kS (ρ
−k). Outside BkS(ρ
−k), that is for αk such that Gk(αk, ρ−k) > 0 or vk(αk, ρ−k) <
VS(ρ
−k), the expression is lower than that value. This proves the assertion.
Properties: There exists kn > 0 such that |σ−k − σ−kkn | ≤ kn implies
(i) if Gk(αk, σ−k) > γkn then C
k
n(α
k, σ−k) ≥ λknγkn − κkn − 2λknGkn →∞
(ii) if Gk(αk, σ−k) = 0 then Ckn(αk, σ−k) = 0






k, σ−k) ≥ λknG(αk, ρ−k) − κkn ≥ λknG(αk, σ−k) − κkn − λknGk(σ−k), so choose kn
small enough that G
k
(σ−k) ≤ 2Gkn.
(ii) Choose kn > 0 such that for all |σ−k − σ−kkn | < kn we have maxαk |Gk(αk, σ−k) −
Gk(αk, σ−kkn )| ≤ G
k
n. Note that maxαk |Gk(αk, σ−kkn ) − Gk(αk, ρ−k)| = G
k
n. Hence by the
triangle inequality Gk(αk, σ−k) = 0 implies Gk(αk, ρ−k) ≤ 2Gkn.
Also choose kn > 0 such that for all |σ−k−σ−kkn | < kn we have V kS (σ−k) ≤ V kS (σ−kkn ) + vkn.
Note that V kS (σ
−k





−k) ≤ V kS (ρ−k) + vkn + V
k
n. Therefore
Gk(αk, σ−k) = 0 implies vk(αk, σ−k) ≤ V kS (ρ−k) + vkn + V
k
n.
Finally choose kn > 0 such that for all |σ−k − σ−kkn | < kn we have maxαk |vk(αk, σ−k)−
vk(αk, σ−kkn )| ≤ vkn. Hence by the triangle inequality maxαk |vk(αk, σ−k)−vk(αk, ρ−k)| ≤ 2vkn.
Putting these inequalities together we see that Gk(αk, σ−k) = 0 implies that Dkn(αk) =










k, σ−k) = 0.
(iii) Recalling that kn > 0 is such that for all |σ−k−σ−kkn | < kn we have maxαk |vk(αk, σ−k)−
vk(αk, σ−kkn )| ≤ vkn, property (iii) follows from
|wkn(αk, σ−k)− vk(αk, σ−k)|
≤ |vk(αk, σ−k)− vk(αk, σ−kkn )|+ |vk(αk, σ−kkn )− vk(αk, ρ−k)|+ dkn(αk) ≤ 2vkn + κkn
Step 2: We now have wkn(α
k, σ−k) and Ckn(αk, σ−k) which are deﬁned in a kn-neighborhood
of σ−kkn and have the right properties there. For |σ−k − ρ−k| < kn we deﬁne r−kkn (σ−k) = σ−kkn
(taking advantage of the fact that these need not be the same for all k). We must now
extend these to functions wkn(α
k, σ−k), Ckn(αk, σ−k), r
−k
kn (σ
−k) on all of R−k while preserving
the right properties and the values of wkn(α
k, σ−kkn ), C
k
n(α
k, σ−kkn ) and r
−k
kn (ρ
−k). We can do
this with a simple pasting. Let βkn(x) be a non-negative continuous real valued function
taking the value of 1 at x = 0 and the value of 0 for x ≥ kn. Then we deﬁne
wkn(α
k, σ−k) = βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |)wkn(αk, σ−k) + (1− βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |))vk(αk, σ−k)
Ckn(α
k, σ−k) = βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |)C
k
n(α
k, σ−k) + (1− βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |))λknGk(αk, σ−k)
rkn(σ
−k) = βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |)rkn(σ−k) + (1− βkn(|σ−k − σ−kkn |))σ−k.
It is easy to check that these pasted functions have the correct properties. Note that
requiring wkn(α
k, σ−k) and Ckn(αk, σ−k) to have the right properties in the kn-neighborhood
of σ−kkn ensures that the above convex combinations inherit those properties.
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Web Appendix 1: Perturbations in the Leading Example
Recall the payoﬀ matrices if player 3 plays C (left) or D (right)
C D
C 6, 6, 5 0, 8, 0
D 8, 0, 0 2, 2, 0
C D
C 10, 10, 0 0, 8, 5
D 8, 0, 5 2, 2, 5
We ease notation a bit. Group 2 is just player 3 who has to choose between C and D; we
let α3 = ρ2[C] = ρ−1[C]. Then recall that given α3 the payoﬀ matrix for players 1, 2 is
C D
C 6 + 4(1− α3), 6 + 4(1− α3) 0, 8
D 8, 0 2, 2
so that if α3 < 1/2 they play CC, if α3 > 1/2 they play DD. We will drop the superscript
from ρ1 = ρ−2 so this is going to be ρ, with ρCC , ρDD the probabilities that group 1 plays
CC or DD. For individual play we will also use αi for the probability that i = 1, 2 plays C.
Player 3 payoﬀ from C is 5ρCC , fromD it is 5(1−ρCC) so indiﬀerence imposes ρCC = 1/2:
if ρCC > 1/2 he plays C, if ρCC < 1/2 he plays D.
Belief Equilibrium
Assume Dirichlet belief model (deﬁned inWeb Appendix 2). What do the group response
functions look like? Recall that σ indicates the beliefs variable. For group 1 they play only
CC and DD, and the probability F 1(α3)[CC] of playing CC is the probability that the
belief σ−1[C] < 1/2; this is strictly between 0 and 1, symmetric around α3 = 1/2 where it
is equal to 1/2 and strictly decreasing in α3.
For player 3 the probability F 2(ρ)[C] of playing C is the probability that the belief
σ−2[CC] > 1/2; this is strictly between 0 and 1 and strictly increasing in ρCC .
Consider what happens at ρCC = ρDD = 1/2 and write f
2
1/2(σ
−2) for the density of 2's
beliefs. Then by symmetry
f21/2(σ
−2[CC] = s|σ−2[CC]+σ−2[DD] = S) = f21/2(σ−2[DD] = s|σ−2[CC]+σ−2[DD] = S)
so that
f21/2(σ
−2[CC] = s|σ−2[CC]+σ−2[DD] = S) = f21/2(σ−2[CC] = S−s|σ−2[CC]+σ−2[DD] = S)
In other words given σ−2[CC] + σ−2[DD] = S then σ−2[CC] is symmetric around S/2,
hence σ−2[CC] > 1/2 occurs less than 1/2 the time so F 2(ρCC)[C] < 1/2. Hence the
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intersection of F 1, F 2 occurs for α3 < 1/2 and and ρCC > 1/2, with ρCD = ρDC = 0, as









As beliefs converge to true values the F 2 function shifts to the right and the intersection
occurs at (1/2, 1/2).
Player 3 in Leadership and Costly Collusion Equilibrium
Player 3's incentive constraint is the same as his objective function: he has the standard
best response function, if ρ1CC > 1/2 he plays C, if ρ
1
CC < 1/2 he plays D and if ρ
1
CC = 1/2
he is indiﬀerent. Because player 3 is the only one in his group he faces no incentive constraint
and hence ν does not matter.
Costly Collusion Equilibrium








with pin → 1. To pin down the group's best response correspondence note that for α3 ≤
1/2, it is simply CC. If the group chooses CC, the objective function takes a value of
2[6 + 4(1 − α3)] − 2 pin1−pin [2 − 4(1 − α3)]. This turns out to be higher than the value of 4
achieved by playing DD if and only if α3 < 4−3pin2 . It turns out that no other mixed strategy
proﬁle is ever an element of the best response set. Consider any mixed strategy proﬁle for
the group. The group payoﬀ would then be
α1α22[6 + 4(1− α3)] + [α1(1− α2) + α2(1− α1)]8
+ (1− α1)(1− α2)4− pin
1− pin [2α
1α2[2− 4(1− α3)] + [α1(1− α2) + α2(1− α1)]2]
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which can be rewritten as
(α1α2)
{
2[6 + 4(1− α3)]− pin










(1− α1)(1− α2)] 4
For pin > 4/5 the term 8 − 2 pin1−pinmust be negative. So the value to the group from
such a mixed strategy proﬁle is the convex combination of the group's value from playing
CC, the negative quantity 8− 2 pin1−pin and 4. When α3 > 4−3pin2 then the group's value from
playing CC is strictly less than 4. Consequently every mixed strategy proﬁle other than
DD must give a value strictly less than 4. Hence the unique group best reply is DD. When
α3 < 4−3pin2 then the group's value from playing CC is strictly greater than 4. So every
mixed strategy proﬁle other than CC must have a value strictly less than that from playing
CC. The unique group best reply is therefore CC. Similarly when α3 = 4−3pin2 CC and DD
are the only elements of the group best reply correspondence.
It follows immediately that the costly collusion equilibrium consists of the group ran-
domizing half half between CC and DD while player 3 plays α3 = 4−3pin2 , for all pin > 4/5.
It is easy to see how this equilibrium converges to the CCE as pin → 1.
Leadership Equilibrium
For α3 < 1/2 playing CC is incentive compatible for the group, the question is how
much can they mix out of the unique bad equilibrium DD when α3 > 1/2 given that they
are willing to forgo gains not larger than ν.
From the payoﬀ matrix of group 1 we see that utility for player 1 is given by u1(α1, α2, α3) =
4α1α2(1−α3)−2α1+6α2+2. The group utility (with weights β1 = β2 = 1) is v1(α1, α2, α3) =
u1 + u2 = 8α1α2(1− α3) + 4α1 + 4α2 + 4; notice that it is increasing in α1 and α2 for any
α3.
Consider the utility gained by player 1 upon deviating from (α1, α2, α3) to (0, α2, α3),
namely 2α1[1− 2α2(1− α3)]. This is strictly positive when α3 > 1/2 for any positive value
of α1 and so the optimal deviation from such proﬁles is precisely to play D with utility
6α2 + 2 and utility gain 2α1[1 − 2α2(1 − α3)]. Group 1 must play ν-incentive compatible
proﬁles, that is proﬁles with gain not larger than ν.
When α3 > 1/2 increasing α2 reduces the utility gain from player 1's optimal deviation
and hence relaxes the incentive constraint for any ν. So in a strict ν-equilibrium we should
choose α1 = α2 and either the constraint binds in that 2α1[1 − 2α1(1 − α3)] = ν or α1 =
α2 = 1 since group utility is increasing in both α1 and α2 for any α3.
Notice that the utility gain G(α1) = −4(α1)2(1 − α3) + 2α1 is quadratic concave with
G(0) = 0, G′ = 2[1− 4α1(1− α3)] so that G′(0) > 0 and G′(1) = 2[1− 4(1− α3)] meaning
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G′(1) < 0 for α3 < 3/4.
Since group utility increases in α1 and α2, if the utility gain at α1 = α2 = 1 that is
G(1) = 2[1 − 2(1 − αˆ3)] turns out to be less than ν group 1 plays CC and player 3 plays
C - not an equilibrium. If this is greater than ν then regardless of the sign of G′(1), G(α1)
reaches ν while increasing, and group 1 plays αˆ1 = αˆ2 such that G(αˆ1) = ν - that is, both
players mix a little just until the incentive constraint is satisﬁed with equality. For small
enough ν the solution to G(αˆ1) = ν must be an αˆ1 so small that ρ1CC < 1/2. This in turn
would make player 3 play D - again not an equilibrium.
Finally consider the case of G(1) = ν so that group 1 shadow mixes between CC and
the smaller solution of −4(αˆ1)2(1 − αˆ3) + 2αˆ1 = ν. For this to be an equilibrium, since
player 3 is mixing, player 1 must mix so that ρ1CC = 1/2. Letting p be the probability of




So in this equilibrium player 3 has a greater than 50% chance of playing C and the
group has a less than 50% chance of playing DD, a 50% chance of playing CC and some
small chance of playing CD,DC. Here the solution for player 3 is on the opposite side of
1/2 from the belief equilibrium case.
Thus equilibrium hasG(1) = G(αˆ1) = ν that is 2αˆ1[1−2αˆ1(1−αˆ3)] = 2[1−2(1−αˆ3)] = ν.
As ν → 0 we get αˆ3 → 1/2 and the smaller solution αˆ1 → 0 so that in the limit the group
shadow mixes half half between CC and DD.
Web Appendix 2: A Dirichlet Based Family of Random Belief Models
We show here that there are -random belief models for every positive value of . An
obvious idea is to take a smooth family of probability distributions with mean equal to the
truth and small variance. A good candidate for a smooth family is the Dirichlet since we
can easily control the precision by increasing the "number of observations." However using
an unbiased probability distribution will not work - it is ill-behaved on the boundary: if we
try to keep the mean equal to the truth, then as we approach the boundary the variance
has to go to zero, and on the boundary there will be a spike. A simple alternative is to
bias the mean slightly towards a ﬁxed strictly positive probability vector alpha with a small
weight on that vector, and then let that weight go to zero as we take the overall variance
to zero.Set h() = (/2)3. Fix a strictly positive probability vector over A−k denoted by
β−k and call the -Dirichlet belief model the Dirichlet distribution with parameter vector
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Theorem 14. The -Dirichlet belief model is an -random belief model.
Proof. Since the parameters are away from the boundary by at least /2 this has the requisite









the covariances of the Dirichlet are negative, E|α˜−k − α−k|2 is bounded by the sum of the
variances and we may apply Chebyshev's inequality to ﬁnd
Pr[|α˜−k − α−k| > /2] ≤ E|α˜−k − α¯−k|2/(/2)2















































|α−k−β−k| ≤ 2 ; then |α˜−k−α−k| >  implies |α˜−k−α−k| >
/2; hence Pr(|α˜−k − α−k| > ) ≤ Pr[|α˜−k − α−k| > /2] ≤ /2 ≤ , which shows that this
is indeed an -random belief model.
Web Appendix 3: Analysis of the Voting Game in Section 7
We start by summarizing the results concerning the diﬀerent types of equilibria and
payoﬀs. The ﬁrst table summarizes the diﬀerent types of equilibria using the notation of
the text. The ﬁrst column is the designation of the equilibrium. The second column gives
the equilibrium strategies. The ﬁnal three columns give the total payoﬀ of the group, player
3 and the sum of all the payoﬀs respectively. The probability of voting in the group's mixed
strategy is denoted by p.
Next we give the ranges of τ for which these equilibria exist, where as in the text
τ˜ ≈ 1.31.
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Table 1: Equilibrium Table
Equilibrium Strategies Group Payoff Pl . 3 Payoff Total Payoff (W )
N α3 = ρ00 = 1 0 0 0
L α3 = 1, ρ10 + ρ01 = 1 2τ − 1 −2τ −1
S α3 = 0, ρ00 = 1 −2τ 2τ − 1 −1
m1 α
3 = 1τ , ρ00 =
1
2τ , ρ10 + ρ01 = 1− 12τ 3− 2τ − 12τ 1− 2τ 4− 4τ − 12τ
M1 α
3 = 12τ , ρ00 =
1
2τ , ρ10 + ρ01 = 1− 12τ 1− 2τ 1− 2τ 2− 4τ
m2 α
3 = 1− 12τ , ρ00 = 12τ , ρ11 = 1− 12τ −3 + 2τ + 12τ 1− 2τ −2 + 12τ
M2 α
3 = 2(1− 12τ ), ρ00 = 12τ , ρ11 = 1− 12τ 2τ − 2 1− 2τ −1
L2 α
3 = 1, p = 1− 1τ 2τ − 2 −2τ + 2τ −2 + 2τ
L3 α
3 = 0, p = 12τ −2τ 2τ − 5 + 1τ −5 + 1τ
M α3 = 1τ
2pτ−1
3p−1 , p = 1− 1√2τ 2
√
2τ−τ√2τ−1+3τ




A α3 = 1τ , pi = 1− 12τ , pj = 0, i 6= j = 1, 2 3− 2τ − 12τ 1− 2τ 4− 4τ − 12τ
Table 2: Existence Table
lower τ upper τ CCE Nash FEE
0 1/2 N N N
1/2 3/4 m2 S L,M1,M2
3/4 1 m2 S L
1 τ˜ m2,m1, L S, L,A L
τ˜ 3/2 m2,m1, L S, L,M,A,L3 L
3/2 2 L S,L, L3 L
2 ∞ L S,L, L2, L3 L
The next table contains payoﬀs comparisons: we compare payoﬀs from the point of view
of the whole set of players, represented by the total payoﬀ, and from the point of view of the
large group. We use W and 1 to denote respectively welfare and large group preference.
We neglect M,L2 and L3 (notice that A is a special case of m1). Then we have:
The last table contains information about the electoral outcome. We let H = ρ11(1−α3)
denote the probability of all voting (High turnout); D = (1−α3)(1−ρ00−ρ11) the probability
of deadlock; and Λ = α3(1 − ρ00) + (1 − α3)ρ11 the probability that large group wins. In
the table the rows denote diﬀerent types of equilibria and the columns provide the relevant
values of H,D,Λ.
In the following: we ﬁrst relate the tables to the assertions made in the text. Analysis
of collusion constrained, Nash and free enforcement equilibria in the game follows. Then
we provide payoﬀ comparisons, and lastly electoral outcome probabilities. Throughout this
appendix we write ρab for ρ
1[a, b].
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Table 3: Payoﬀs comparisons
τ CCE Nash FEE W 1
1/2 < τ < 3/4 m2 S L,M1,M2 M1 W L ∼W S ∼W M2 W m2 L 1 M1 1 M2 1 m2 1 S
3/4 < τ < 1 m2 S L L ∼W S W m2 L 1 m2 1 S
1 < τ ≤ 9/8 m1,m2, L S, L L m1 W L ∼W S L 1 m1 1 m2 1 S
9/8 ≤ τ < τ˜ m1,m2, L S, L L L ∼W S W m1 W m2 L 1 m1 1 m2 1 S
τ˜ < τ < 3/2 m1,m2, L S, L L L ∼W S W m2 W m1 L 1 m2 1 m1 1 S
3/2 < τ < 2 L S,L L S ∼W L L 1 S
τ > 2 L S,L L S ∼W L L 1 S
Table 4: Electoral outcome probabilities
ρ11 H D Λ
S 0 0 0 0
L 0 0 0 1
m1 0 0 (1− 12τ )(1− 1τ ) 1τ (1− 12τ )
m2 1− 12τ (1− 12τ ) 12τ 0 1− 12τ
M1 0 0 (1− 12τ )2 12τ (1− 12τ )
M2 1− 12τ (1− 12τ )( 1τ − 1) 0 1− 12τ
Assertions in the Text
From Tables 1 and 2 the total payoﬀW is negative except for the non-voting equilibrium
N .
From Table 3 M1 gives welfare greater than −1 and m1 gives welfare greater than −1
in the range 1 ≤ τ ≤ 9/8.
From Tables 1 and 2 all equilibria other than M1,m1 and N give welfare no more than
−1.
From Tables 1 and 2 in CCE and FEE the small player always gets a negative utility.
In the range 3/4 < τ < 1 from Table 3 m2 is less eﬃcient than S or L but the large
group does better than S and does worse than L.
In the range 3/4 < τ < 1 from Table 4 as the stakes τ increase at m2 the probability
of both members of the large group voting, the probability of everyone voting and the
probability of the large group winning all increase, while from Table 1 total welfare decreases.
In the range 1/2 < τ < 3/2 in m1 and m2from Table 1 the small group does better than
at L with utility of 1− 2τ versus −2τ while from Table 3 the large group does worse than
L.
In the range 1/2 < τ < 3/4 from Table 1 in m2 and M2 the group mixes the same way,
but the third player must vote more frequently in m2 and M2 .
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In the range 1/2 < τ < 3/4 for FEE we have from Table 3 that M1 1 M2 but from
Table 4 gives them a smaller probability of winning Λ.
In the range 1 < τ < τ˜ for CCE we have from Table 3 that m1 1 m2 but from Table
4 gives them a smaller probability of winning Λ.
Equilibria
It is convenient in the analysis of equilibria to create a single group 1 payoﬀ matrix as
a function of α3 by averaging together the two matrices corresponding to 3 not voting and
voting.
1 0
1 τ − 1, τ − 1 (2α3 − 1)τ − 1, (2α3 − 1)τ
0 (2α3 − 1)τ, (2α3 − 1)τ − 1 (α3 − 1)τ, (α3 − 1)τ
To the matrix above we add the constant 1 + τ(1 − 2α3) since this is independent of
group 1 play; this gives the following payoﬀ matrix for group 1:
1 0
1 2τ(1− α3), 2τ(1− α3) 0, 1
0 1, 0 1− α3τ, 1− α3τ
We also make the observation that optimality of the small group (player 3) depends only
on ρ00 and that if ρ00 < 1/(2τ) ≡ Υ then α3 = 1, if ρ00 > Υ then α3 = 0 and if ρ00 = Υ
then player 3 is indiﬀerent. Notice also that Υ ≤ 1 if and only if τ ≥ 1/2. Hence if τ < 1/2
then α3 = 1 in any equilibrium.
Collusion Constrained Equilibria
Case 1: τ < 1/2. Nobody votes, equilibrium N . It is easy to check that this is the only
group correlated equilibrium.
Case 2: 1/2 < τ < 1. There is a unique CCE where α3 = 1−Υ , ρ00 = 1/(2τ) = Υ and
ρ11 = 1 − Υ. This is m2. This CCE has shadow mixing. The remaining group correlated
equilibria are: ρ00 = Υ, ρ11 = 1− ρ00 and 0 < α3 < 1− 1/(2τ); and α3 = 0, ρ00 ≥ Υ, ρ11 =
1− ρ00.
Proof. If 2τ(1− α3) < 1 that is α3 > 1− 1/2τ the only equilibrium for 1 is 00 and then 3
would prefer to vote whence α3 = 0. It must then be 2τ(1− α3) ≥ 1 that is α3 ≤ 1− 1/2τ
in any group correlated equilibrium. In this case the group faces a coordination game with
three Nash equilibria: both vote, neither votes and the symmetric mixed equilibrium.
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Let p be the probability of voting in the symmetric mixed equilibrium. The indiﬀerence
is 2τ(1 − α3)p = p + (1 − p)(1 − α3τ) whence p = (1 − α3τ)/[τ(2 − 3α3)]. This increases
in α3 from p(0) = 1/2τ > 1/2 to p(1 − 1/2τ) = 1. Since α3 < 1 for this to be part of an
equilibrium 3 should weakly prefer voting (otherwise α3 = 1) and this means −[1 − (1 −
p)2] + (4τ − 1)(1− p)2 ≥ 2τ(1− p)2 which is equivalent to p ≤ 1− 1/√2τ < 1− 1/2τ < 1/2;
this is not in the range of equilibrium p's for group 1. Hence 1 playing their mixed Nash in
any group correlated equilibrium is ruled out.
Next: in any group correlated equilibrium the probability that 1 plays (0, 0) must be
positive, otherwise 3 prefers not voting (α3 = 1) and 1 would play (0, 0) for sure. And also
the probability that 1 plays (1, 1) must be positive, otherwise when 1 is told to vote he
knows 2 is not voting and would deviate. So ρ00, ρ11 > 0. For the possible values of ρ10 and
ρ01 we are left to consider there are the two cases where correlated equilibrium probability
is concentrated on (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0) or on (1, 1), (0, 1), (0, 0). They are essentially the same,
we consider the ﬁrst. Player 1 indiﬀerence gives ρ11 · 2τ(1−α3) = ρ11 +ρ10(1−α3τ) that is
ρ11[2τ(1−α3)−1] = ρ10(1−α3τ) and analogously from player 2 we get ρ10[2τ(1−α3)−1] =
ρ00(1 − α3τ); from ρ11 + ρ10 + ρ00 = 1, letting A = [2τ(1 − α3) − 1]/(1 − α3τ) we get in
particular ρ00 = A
2/(1+A+A2). Again player 3 should weakly prefer voting, which in this
case gives −(ρ11+ρ10)+(4τ−1)ρ00 ≥ 2τρ00 that is ρ00 ≥ 1/2τ . Thus for 1's CE to be part of
an equilibrium it must be 2τ ≥ (1+A+A2)/A2. Now the RHS decreases in A and A reaches
its maximum for α3 = 0 where its value is A0 = 2τ−1. So (1+A+A2)/A2 ≥ 1+2τ/(2τ−1)2.
But since 0 < 2τ−1 < 1 we have (2τ−1)3 < 2τ which is equivalent to 2τ < 1+2τ/(2τ−1)2,
whence 2τ ≥ (1 + A + A2)/A2 is false for all admissible values of A. This shows that
ρ01 = ρ10 = 0 in any group correlated equilibrium.
Summing up, group correlated equilibria have α3 ≤ 1 − 1/2τ and ρ00 + ρ11 = 1 with
ρ00, ρ11 > 0. That player 3 should weakly prefer voting gives ρ00 ≥ Υ, with equality if
α3 > 0. This yields the equilibrium set in the statement.
For CCE: The threshold between dominant strategy and coordination game occurs when
given that one party member votes the other is indiﬀerent to voting: the condition is
2τ(1−α3) = 1 so that α3 = 1− 1/(2τ). This is strictly positive, so ρ00 = Υ. The equilibria
with smaller α3 are not CCE because collusion would lead the group to play the voting
equilibrium for sure.
Case 3: 1 < τ < 3/2. There are three sets of CCEs: (a) a continuum of CCEs where
player 3 does not vote and the group mixes with any probability over (1, 0) and (0, 1), which
is L; (b) a CCE where α3 = 1− 1/2τ and the group plays (1, 1) with probability 1− 1/2τ
and (0, 0) with probability 1/2τ , which is m2 and (c) a CCE with α
3 = 1/τ where with
probability 1− 1/2τ the group mixes over (1, 0) and (0, 1) while with probability 1/2τ they
play (0, 0), which is m1.
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Proof. For α3 ≤ 1− 1/2τ , (1, 1) and (0, 0) are Nash equilibria along with a mixed strategy
equilibrium. The highest payoﬀ for the group comes from (1, 1). For 1− 1/2τ < α3 < 1/τ
the game becomes dominance solvable with the unique equilibrium (0, 0). For all higher
values of α3, the Nash equilibria are (1, 0) and (0, 1) along with the mixed equilibrium.
The highest payoﬀ for the group in this case turns out to be any of the group correlated
equilibria with mixing over (1, 0) and (0, 1). For these higher values of α3 where 1/τ < α3
and 1 < τ < 3/2 the expected payoﬀ to each player from the mixed Nash is always strictly
less than that from the group correlated equilibrium average payoﬀ. Indeed, the inequality
is 2pτ(1− α3) < 1/2, which since α3 > 1/τ > 2/3 reads 4(α3τ − 1)(1− α3) < 3α3 − 2 that
is 4α3τ(1− α3) < 2− α3; the left member is decreasing in α3, and using this and τ < 3/2
we get 4α3τ(1− α3) < 43 < 2− α3, last inequality from α3 > 2/3.
Thus in this case the group best response correspondence is as follows:
(1, 1) if α3 ≤ 1− 1/2τ
(0, 0) if 1− 1/2τ ≤ α3 ≤ 1/τ
correlated if 1/τ ≤ α3
So for any 1 < τ < 3/2, we get three sets of CCEs. (a) α3 = 1 and the group mixes
over (1, 0) and (0, 1), (b) α3 = 1−1/2τ and the group plays (1, 1) with probability 1−1/2τ
and (0, 0) with probability 1/2τ and (c) α3 = 1/τ and with probability 1− 1/2τ the group
mixes over (1, 0) and (0, 1) while with probability 1/2τ they play (0, 0), as asserted.
Case 4: τ > 3/2. There is a continuum of CCEs, where player 3 does not vote and the
group mixes with any probability over (1, 0) and (0, 1).
Proof. It is seen from group 1 payoﬀ matrix that for α3τ ≤ 1, (1, 1) and (0, 0) are Nash
equilibria along with a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium where the probability say p




The highest payoﬀ for the group comes from (1, 1). For 1/τ < α3 < 1 − 1/2τ the game
becomes dominance solvable with the unique equilibrium (1, 1). For α3 = 1 − 1/2τ there
are three equilibria: (1, 1), (1, 0) and (0, 1) and again the best equilibrium for the group is
(1, 1).
For α3 > 1 − 1/2τ the equilibria are (1, 0) and (0, 1) and the mixed equilibrium as
above. Turning to the group payoﬀ, the two pure NE give the same payoﬀ hence so does
any mixture of the two; the alternative to consider is the mixed equilibrium. In the latter
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the expected payoﬀ to each player (say when player 1 plays 1) is 2pτ(1−α3); in the former
per-player payoﬀ is 1/2. Recalling that in the range under consideration α3τ > 1, the
condition for the mixed to be better than the correlated mixtures becomes
2− α3
4α3(1− α3) ≤ τ
In the relevant range - τ > 3/2 and α3 > 1 − 1/2τ imply α3 > 2/3 - the left hand side is
increasing, so letting αˆ3(τ) solve the above with equality we get that: the mixed Nash is
better for α3 ≤ αˆ3(τ), while the mixture over the two pure Nash is better for α3 > αˆ3(τ).
So the group best response correspondence is as follows:
(1, 1) if α3 ≤ 1− 1/2τ
mixed if 1− 1/2τ < α3 ≤ αˆ3(τ)
correlated if α3 > αˆ3(τ)
Now we can search for collusion constrained equilibria. Player 3's best response to the
group playing (1, 1) is to set α3 = 1. So there cannot be a CCE with α3 ≤ 1− 1/2τ . Since
Player 3's best response to the group mixing over (1, 0) and (0, 1) is to again play α3 = 1, we
must also rule out CCE where αˆ3(τ) < α3 < 1. The group mixing over (1, 0) and (0, 1) with
some probability and player 3 choosing α3 = 1, is indeed a CCE. Consider the possibility
of a CCE that involves the group playing the mixed Nash equilibrium and player 3 mixing
too. For Player 3 to be indiﬀerent (in order to mix) it must be that p = 1 − 1/√2τ . Now
the equilibrium p in the mixed Nash is decreasing in α3 over the relevant region: it takes
values from 1 when α3 = 1− 1/2τ to (τ − 1)/τ when α3 = 1. Since (τ − 1)/τ > 1− 1/√2τ
for τ > 2, for such values of τ we cannot have such a CCE. For 3/2 < τ ≤ 2 there does
exist an α3 that solves
1− α3τ
τ(2− 3α3) = 1−
1√
2τ
but the solution has α3 > αˆ3(τ) whence there is no CCE in the range 1−1/2τ < α3 ≤ αˆ3(τ)
either.18






) = 1−2τ(1−α3), while α3 ≤ αˆ3(τ)













α3 − 1) so the
equality implies 1− 2τ(1− α3) > √3( 3
2
α3 − 1) that is 2τ(1− α3) < 1−√3( 3
2
α3 − 1), whence
















− 2)] = 2
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Nash
Recall that τ˜ ≡ 1/(3 − √5) ≈ 1.31. Reiterating the payoﬀ matrix for the group for
visibility:
1 0
1 2τ(1− α3), 2τ(1− α3) 0, 1
0 1, 0 1− α3τ, 1− α3τ
Case 1: ρ00 < Υ and α
3 = 1. The payoﬀ matrix for the group is
1 0
1 0, 0 0, 1
0 1, 0 1− τ, 1− τ
If τ < 1 then it is dominant to play 0 and this is not an equilibrium. If τ > 1 then there
are two pure equilibria where one voter in the group votes and these imply ρ00 < Υ so this
corresponds to the equilibrium L. The other equilibrium is symmetric and mixed, continuing





Here p > 0 requires Υ ≤ 1/2. The probability that neither player votes is 4Υ2 which
must satisfy 4Υ2 < Υ or Υ < 1/4. Hence we have an equilibrium of this type (it is L2) if
1/(2τ) < 1/4 or τ > 2. Notice that in this equilibrium the probability that the group wins
1− 4Υ2 is larger than 3/4.
Case 2: ρ00 > Υ and α
3 = 0. Recall that this requires τ ≥ 1/2 (otherwise α3 = 1). The
payoﬀ matrix for the group is
1 0
1 2τ, 2τ 0, 1
0 1, 0 1, 1
This coordination game has one pure strategy equilibrium where both vote, which con-
tradicts ρ00 > Υ and one where neither vote, corresponding to the equilibrium S which
therefore exists for all values of τ ≥ 1/2. It also has a unique symmetric mixed equilibrium
where the indiﬀerence condition is p2τ = 1 or p = Υ. The probability that neither vote is
then (1−Υ)2 and the condition is (1−Υ)2 > Υ. This is 1− 3Υ + Υ2 > 0 which has roots
where the last inequality follows from the fact that in the relevant range α3 ≥ 2/3 the function α3√3[√3−
(3α3 − 2)] is decreasing.
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at (3 ± √5)/2 and is positive only for Υ smaller than the lesser root (3 − √5)/2 ≈ 0.38.
That is to say, we have an equilibrium of this type when τ > 1/(3−√5) = τ˜ . This is L3
Case 3: ρ00 = Υ. Indiﬀerences give the same values of p and α
3 as in the case of
1/2 < τ < 1 that is









This equilibrium - labeled M - exists for
τ˜ < τ < 3/2
In addition, for 1 < τ < 32 there is an asymmetric partially mixed equilibrium where one
of the players in the group does not vote and the other votes with probability 1−Υ while
α3 = 2Υ. This is equilibrium A. Notice that this is a special case of m1.
Proof. If both group members mix we must have symmetry and this gives (1− p)2 = Υ, or
p = 1 − √Υ > 0 . From the group payoﬀ matrix we see that if τ < 1/2 then 0 is strictly
dominant, so this is impossible. Assume τ > 1/2. For τ > 1/2 the indiﬀerence condition
of player 1 between voting and not when 2 votes with probability p gives p2τ(1 − α3) =






We then plug p = 1 − √Υ and look at the sign of numerator and denominator of this
expression. The numerator is 2τ(1−1/√2τ)−1 = 2τ−√2τ−1. This is positive if and only
if 2τ−1 > √2τ , which since τ > 1/2 is equivalent to (2τ−1)2 > 2τ that is 4τ2−6τ+1 > 0.
This has roots (3 ±√5)/4 and is negative in between. Note that the lesser root is < 1/2.
The denominator is positive for 3(1 − 1/√2τ) − 1 > 0 that is for τ > 9/8. Note that
(3 +
√
5)/4 = 1/(3−√5) > 9/8 hence for τ > 1/2 the numerator and denominator have the
same sign if and only if 1/2 < τ < 9/8 (both negative) or τ > 1/(3−√5) (both positive).
In the latter case α3 < 1 requires 2pτ −1 < 3p−1 which is to say 2τ < 3 or τ < 3/2, and in
this range this equilibrium exists. In the former case α3 ≤ 1 would require 2pτ − 1 ≥ 3p− 1
which is true only for τ ≥ 2 so this range is ruled out.
Now consider the possibility of only one group member mixing. Say player 1 mixes
while player 2 plays 0 with certainty. It must be that 1 − p1 = ρ00 = Υ. For player 1
to be so indiﬀerent we need α3 = 2Υ. For player 2 to prefer not voting to voting, we
need (1 − 12τ )(3 − 2τ) ≥ 0. Satisfying this inequality along with α3 ≤ 1, gives the range
1 < τ < 32 . So for each 1 < τ <
3
2 , we get two more mixed equilibria, in each of which one
group member plays 0 for sure while the other does so with probability Υ and α3 = 2Υ.
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Free Enforcement Equilibrium
Assuming uniform weights in the group utility, group 1 payoﬀs are 1 − α3τ if neither
votes, 1/2 if one votes and 2τ(1−α3) if both vote. Recalling that if ρ00 < 1/(2τ) ≡ Υ then
α3 = 1, if ρ00 > Υ then α
3 = 0 and if ρ00 = Υ then player 3 is indiﬀerent, equilibrium
analysis goes as follows.
Case 1: ρ00 < Υ and α
3 = 1. Group payoﬀs are 1 − τ, 1/2, 0. If 1 − τ > 1/2 that is
τ < 1/2 the optimum is not to vote and this is an equilibrium, since Υ > 1 for τ < 1/2. If
τ > 1/2 the optimum is for exactly one to vote leading to the equilibrium L - hence this is
the equilibrium for τ > 1/2.
Case 2: ρ00 > Υ and α
3 = 0. Group payoﬀs are 1, 1/2, 2τ . If τ > 1/2 optimum is vote,
not an equilibrium given ρ00 > 0. For τ < 1/2 notice that α
3 = 0 cannot be optimal. So,
no equilibrium corresponds to this case.
Case 3: ρ00 = Υ, this requires that 1−α3τ ≥ 1/2, 2τ(1−α3) with at least one equality.
Case 3a: 1 − α3τ = 1/2, 1/2 ≥ 2τ(1 − α3). The ﬁrst solves as α3 = Υ which we know
requires τ ≥ 1/2. The inequality becomes 1/2 ≥ 2τ(2τ − 1)/(2τ) = 2τ − 1 that is τ ≤ 3/4.
Hence for 1/2 < τ < 3/4 there is an equilibrium with ρ11 = 0 and α
3 = Υ. This is M1.
Case 3b: 2τ(1−α3) = 1−α3τ , 1−α3τ ≥ 1/2. The ﬁrst one gives α3 = 2−1/τ = 2(1−Υ).
For Υ we need as usual τ ≥ 1/2. We also need 2− 1/τ ≤ 1 or 1 ≤ 1/τ or τ ≤ 1. Plugging
into the inequality we get 1−(2− 1/τ) τ ≥ 1/2 which gives τ ≤ 3/4. Hence if 1/2 < τ < 3/4
there is another equilibrium with ρ11 = 1−Υ and α3 = 2(1−Υ). This is M2.
Payoﬀ comparisons
For the welfare of all three players combined we have
L, S W m2 ⇐⇒ τ > 1/2, L, S W m1 ⇐⇒ τ v 1.14
m1 W m2 ⇐⇒ τ < τ˜ , M1 W L, S ⇐⇒ τ < 3/4
For the large group the inequalities are as follows:
L 1 S ⇐⇒ τ > 1/4, L 1 m1 ⇐= τ > 1, m1 1 m2 ⇐⇒ 0.2 < τ < τ˜
M1 1 M2 ⇐⇒ τ < 3/4, L 1 M1 ⇐⇒ τ > 1/2, M1 1 m2 =⇒ τ w 0.85
M2 1 m2 ⇐⇒ τ > 1/2, m2 1 S ⇐= τ > 1/2, m1 1 S ⇐⇒ τ > 1/6
Going in the order of the last display, for the three players we have:
L, S W m2 ⇐⇒ −1 > −2 + 12τ ⇐⇒ 12τ < 1 ⇐⇒ τ > 1/2
L, S W m1 ⇐⇒ −1 > 4− 4τ − 12τ ⇐⇒ 8τ2 − 10τ + 1 > 0 ⇐⇒ .11 w τ w 1.14
m1 W m2 ⇐⇒ 4 − 4τ − 12τ > −2 + 12τ ⇐⇒ 6 − 4τ − 1τ > 0 ⇐⇒ 4τ2 − 6τ + 1 >
0 ⇐⇒ .19 w τ ≤ τ˜
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M1 W L, S ⇐⇒ 2− 4τ > −1 ⇐⇒ 3 > 4τ ⇐⇒ τ < 3/4
For the large group:
L 1 S ⇐⇒ 2τ − 1 > −2τ ⇐⇒ 4τ > 1 ⇐⇒ τ > 1/4
L 1 m1 ⇐⇒ 2τ − 1 > 3− 2τ − 12τ ⇐⇒ 4τ − 4 + 12τ > 0 ⇐⇒ 8τ2 − 8τ + 1 > 0⇐=
τ > 0.85
m1 1 m2 ⇐⇒ 3− 2τ − 12τ > −3 + 2τ + 12τ ⇐⇒ 6− 4τ − 1τ > 0 ⇐⇒ 4τ2 − 6τ + 1 <
0 ⇐⇒ 0.2 < τ < τ˜
M1 1 M2 ⇐⇒ 1− 2τ > 2τ − 2 ⇐⇒ 3 > 4τ
L 1 M1 ⇐⇒ 2τ − 1 > 1− 2τ ⇐⇒ 4τ > 2
M1 1 m2 ⇐⇒ 1− 2τ > −3 + 2τ + 12τ ⇐⇒ 8τ2 − 8τ + 1 < 0 ⇐⇒ 0.15 w τ w 0.85
M2 1 m2 ⇐⇒ 2τ − 2 > −3 + 2τ + 12τ ⇐⇒ 1 > 12τ ⇐⇒ τ > 1/2
m2 1 S ⇐⇒ −3 + 2τ + 12τ > −2τ ⇐⇒ 8τ2 − 6τ + 1 > 0⇐= τ > 1/2
m1 1 S ⇐⇒ 3− 2τ − 12τ > −2τ ⇐⇒ 3 > 12τ ⇐⇒ τ > 1/6
We check that it is always the case that M ≺W S,L. Indeed this is equivalent to
1− 2τ + 2
√
2τ−√2τ 32−1+3τ
3−2√2τ < −1 that is 2− 2τ + 2
√
2τ−√2τ 32−1+3τ
3−2√2τ < 0. In the relevant range





2τ − τ√2τ − 1 + 3τ) > 0 which simpliﬁes to 2√2[√2−√τ + τ√τ ] > 0 which
is true for every τ > 0.
Electoral outcome probabilities
Electoral outcome probabilities are also elementarily obtained. Recall that H = ρ11(1−
α3), D = (1− α3)(1− ρ00 − ρ11) and Λ = α3(1− ρ00) + (1− α3)ρ11; we just have to apply
these formulas.
We follow the order of the table. In S we have H = D = Λ = 0. In L the only diﬀerence
is Λ = 1.
In m1 we have α
3 = 1τ , ρ00 =
1
2τ , ρ10 + ρ01 = 1− 12τ . So H = 0, D = (1− 1τ )(1− 12τ ) and
Λ = 1τ (1− 12τ ).
In m2 it is α
3 = 1 − 12τ , ρ00 = 12τ , ρ11 = 1 − 12τ so H = (1 − 12τ ) 12τ , D = 0 and
Λ = (1− 12τ )2 + (1− 12τ ) 12τ = 1− 12τ
In M1 we have α
3 = 12τ , ρ00 =
1
2τ , ρ10 + ρ01 = 1 − 12τ so H = 0, D = (1 − 12τ )2 and
Λ = 12τ (1− 12τ ).
Finally, in M2 we have α
3 = 2(1− 12τ ), ρ00 = 12τ , ρ11 = 1− 12τ so H = (1− 12τ )[1− 2(1−
1
2τ )] = (1− 12τ )( 1τ − 1), D = 0, and Λ = 2(1− 12τ )(1− 12τ ) + [1− 2(1− 12τ )](1− 12τ ) = 1− 12τ .
For the ranges of H in m2 and M2 and of D in m1 and M1 we have:
H in m2: up from 0 for τ = 1/2 to 2/9 for τ = 3/4, still up to 1/4 for τ = 1 then down
to 2/9 again for τ = 3/2.
H in M2: up from 0 for τ = 1/2 to 1/8 for τ = 2/3, then down to 1/9 for τ = 3/4
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D in m1: up from 0 for τ = 1 to 2/9 for τ = 3/2
D in M1: up from 0 for τ = 1/2 to 1/9 for τ = 3/4
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